

Kipling's Afghanistan

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CENTRAL ASIA

Journal of Area Study Centre

NO. 74 SUMMER 2014

Publishing since 1979

Central Asia

ISSN 1729-9802

ISSUE NO. 74

SUMMER 2014



Journal of Area Study Centre
(Russia, China & Central Asia)
University of Peshawar
Peshawar-PAKISTAN

CENTRAL ASIA

Biannual

No. 74

Summer 2014

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Cover Image
Joseph Rudyard Kipling
(1865-1936)

Born in Bombay Presidency, the British India, died in London. English orientalist, poet, journalist, novelist and short-story writer. Chiefly remembered for his celebration of the British imperialism, his tales and poems of British soldiers in Afghanistan and India, and his tales for children. He received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1907.

Source: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rudyard-Kipling>

KIPLING'S AFGHANISTAN

Sarfraz Khan* and Abdul Hamid Khan**

Abstract

This paper views Afghanistan as perceived by the Indian-born English colonialist, a creative genius, Rudyard Kipling, who has written on the British Indian Empire with a distinct style. From literary standpoint, his works under review may be termed as distinctly political, vivid examples of how an indigenous native state and its people were suitably constructed to the exigencies of the Empire, during the Victorian Era. The paper explores Rudyard Kipling's perspective on Afghanistan and its rulers with a particular reference to Amir Abdur Rahman, beside his colonial stance on the Anglo-Afghan relationship, in the backdrop of the so-called 'Great Game' between England and Russia, in the 19th Century. A spokesman of British Indian Empire, he presents Afghanistan as a native state and strategic space in the colonial context. The paper provides critical analyses of seven of Kipling's works including four poems and three short stories using this framework. Two of his works, A Young British Soldier (1892) and Ford O' Kabul River (1879) directly focus the bloody conflict, known to history as the 2nd Anglo-Afghan War. Rudyard Kipling dwells upon the theme, Afghan Amirate, particularly, the ruling style of Amir Abdur Rahman (r.1880 to 1891) in: Her Majesty's Servants (1894), The Ballad of the King's Jest (1890), The Ballad of the King's Mercy (1889), The Amir's Homily (1891) and The Man Who Would Be King (1888).

Keywords: Kipling, Afghanistan, Great Game, Kabul River, British Soldier, Empire, Amir Abdur Rahman

Introduction

Though, Kipling's insight into the Afghans or Pakhtuns and his perception and worldview, has thoroughly been imperialistic, yet one cannot totally repudiate his understanding of the people of India as well as

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Afghanistan, places, he always considered interesting, to write about. He took up the subject of Anglo-Afghan Wars and the ruthlessness of Amir Abdur Rahman in: *The Amir's Homily*, *The Ballad of the King's Jest*, *Her Majesty Servants*, and *The Ballad of the King's Mercy*. His other two poems, *A Young British Soldier* and *Ford O, Kabul River*, dwelling upon the British Indian Empire and Afghanistan, do carry interesting contemporary relevance too. In addition, one of Kipling's most famous stories, *The Man Who Would Be King* (1888), with its setting in *Kafiristan*, currently *Nooristan*, provides clues about empire-building. "It is the romantic/unscientific works of Winston S. Churchill and Rudyard Kipling that gave the think-tanks their ideas about what makes the Afghans click."¹

Biographical Note

Joseph Rudyard Kipling was born on December 30, 1865, in Bombay (now, Mumbai, India), British India, to Alice and Lockwood Kipling. He remained with his family till the age of six. Afterwards, as a tradition among the Anglo-Indians, Kipling too had to proceed to mother country for education, before returning to India in 1882. He worked as a journalist with the Civil and Military Gazette and The Pioneer, till 1887. His most important work, *Kim*, was published in 1901, focusing on the story of espionage commonly known to history as the *Great Game*. Kipling is the first Englishman, and the youngest Nobel Laureate (1901), having written volumes of poetry, and many collections of short stories, in addition to a substantial and interesting non-fiction comprising of letters, notes and speeches. His last work, *Something For My Friends Known And Unknown* (1937), published after his demise on January 18, 1936, is a sombre reflection of a man who had lived a controversial but eventful life. He is considered to be one of the most important writers of the late Victorian Era, fully committed to the British Empire.

For George Orwell, 'Kipling is a jingo imperialist, he is morally insensitive and aesthetically disgusting...Kipling is the only English writer of our time who has added phrases to the language'.² The reason of this dichotomy might have been that Kipling raised too many questions for a critic, to holistically respond to, in a single document. In order to celebrate Kipling and his work, a voluntary organization, *The Kipling Society*, had been founded in 1927 with a comprehensive research library. The society, every quarter, publishes the Kipling's Journal, focusing on aspects of Kipling as a man and a literary figure.

¹ Cowie, I., *The Crystallisations of McCrystal Leaked and Leaky Policy Paper*. The Asian Conference on the Social Sciences, 2011, p 224. Retrieved from <http://www.jafor.org>, accessed 13/12/15

² Orwell, G., *Essay on Kipling*. Retrieved from http://orwell.ru/library/reviews/kipling/english/e_rkip, accessed on 10/04/16

1. 'Kabul Town is a Blasted Place'

Ford o' Kabul River (1879)³, a Kipling's short poem, warns of the dangers awaiting the British soldiers in Afghanistan. This poem is an amazingly relevant work even today, given the presence of British/NATO troops in bloody conflict and unceasing insurgency in Afghanistan. Kipling could foresee the fallout of a British defeat and advises the British soldiers to be vigilant and alert. He forewarns them that Kabul is like hell and not an easy assignment to come out of that inferno with success and glory, which tragically, proved Kipling right, as in the first Anglo-Afghan war, only one British serviceman, the lonely, Dr. Bryden, could make it back to British India. In the new millennium roughly one and a half century later, from the days during which Kipling worked in India as a journalist, the situation has not changed much in Central Asia, particularly, in Afghanistan. The realities on the ground are callously identical and Kipling wishes:

*Kabul town's a blasted place --
Blow the bugle, draw the sword --
Keep the crossing-stakes beside you, an' they will surely guide you
'Cross the ford o' Kabul river in the dark.
Kabul town'll go to hell --
Blow the bugle, draw the sword --*⁴

Critical reading reveals Kipling's views on empire and imperialism quite in contrast to those sitting in England, taking important decisions, determining India's destiny. This ambivalence in Kipling's work is reflective of his civilizing mission and the humanitarianism and its pitfalls, in case the project is not properly handled. Kipling concludes his song for the British soldiers fighting in Afghanistan and directs them in a typical jingoistic tone which he loved so much to play.

2. The King among His Girls

The Ballad of The King's Mercy (1889)⁵ is a poem relating a story of an unknown person charged with murdering a *Yousafzai*. He is about to be executed when King Abdul Rehman passes by and orders the captain of his guards to punish the accused by butchering him. Since he is ridiculed for his butcher-like ruthlessness, he intends to take revenge even on the King and tries to kill him. However, he fails to do so and is unfortunately, caught by

³ Retrieved from http://www.garenewing.co.uk/angloafghanwar/articles/fordokabul_poem.php, accessed on 10/04/16

⁴ Retrieved from <http://www.bartleby.com/364/223.html>, accessed on 10/04/16

⁵ Retrieved from http://www.kipling.org.uk/poems_mercy.htm, accessed on 17/3/2011

the King himself and tortured to death by stoning, following three days of harsh punishment.⁶

*Abdhur Rahman, the Durani Chief, of him is the story told.
His mercy fills the Khyber hills—his grace is manifold;
He has taken toll of the North and the South—his glory reacheth far,
And they tell the tale of his charity from Balkh to Kandahar.
Before the old Peshawar Gate, where Kurd and Kaffir meet,
The Governor of Kabul dealt the Justice of the Street,
And that was strait as running noose and swift as plunging knife,
Tho' he who held the longer purse might hold the longer life.
There was a hound of Hindustan had struck a Euzufzai,
Wherefore they spat upon his face and led him out to die.
It chanced the King went forth that hour when throat was bared to knife;
The Kaffir grovelled under-hoof and clamoured for his life.⁷*

Rudyard wrote the rollicking “Ballad of the King’s Mercy” which—to confuse anyone who finds his ‘imperialism’ easy to interpret—is studiously respectful to the brutal workings of royal Afghan justice in the Khyber hills. Still wary of putting his head too far above the parapet, he signed his poem with the pseudonym ‘Yussuf—not that many readers were deceived, given the subject matter.⁸

3. The Mind of a King

The Ballad of the King's Jest (1890)⁹ explores the strong ruling style of the Amir. Written by Kipling under his pen name Yousaf, here he unfolds a gruesome tale, depicting the King. It is the tragic story of a young man who, having heard the rumours of a Russian invasion of Afghanistan, breaks the news to the King’s men, who inform the King. Before Kipling tells us the story, he paints a picture telling of the spring times and of the caravan coming down the Khyber Pass to Peshawar. He creates a setting of grim consequences, telling of war, power and a ‘blood red sky’.

*When spring-time flushes the desert grass,
Our kafilas wind through the Khyber Pass.
Lean are the camels but fat the frails,
Light are the purses but heavy the bales,*

⁶ Retrieved from http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_mercy.htm, accessed on 1/04/16

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Lycett, A., *Sees Kipling as being Respectful, Rather than Critical of Abdur Rahman's Brutal Regime*, p 197

⁹ Retrieved from http://www.poetryloverspage.com/poets/kipling/ballad_of_kings_jest.html, accessed on 10/4/16

*As the snowbound trade of the North comes down
 To the market-square of Peshawur town.
 Four things greater than all things are, --
 Women and Horses and Power and War.
 Friend of my heart, is it meet or wise
 To warn a King of his enemies?*¹⁰

In an unfortunate moment of his wretched life, the man, after hearing the rumour of the 'grey coat', [Russians] invading Afghanistan, decides to break the news to Amir Abdur Rahman with a vain wish to get favour. The news stirred the Amir's Darbar and the King's face turned 'dark as death' and in his royal wrath, took the informer to a tree to watch the Russians coming and alarmed the Afghan forces to be ready for the war.

*When the face of the King showed dark as death.
 Evil it is in full durbar
 To cry to a ruler of gathering war!*¹¹

The tale takes an ominous turn at the end as the man is kept imprisoned on the tree, fully guarded by the Afghan soldiers lest he escape. For seven long days, as the story enjoins, the damned soul survives till madness takes over, and he skips and jumps like apes and bear. Having become too weak, he hangs onto the peach tree 'like a bat' till gets sleepy, and falls, impaled on the waiting points of knives.

4. The Red Law

The Amir's Homily (1891)¹², included in the collection, *Life's Handicap*, is a short story about a young man charged with stealing and brought before the Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman. He rebukes the young man for the act and narrates him his own story, there is no justification for such crimes, and that only hard work is acceptable. Accordingly, he is punished with the same detachment typical of the image Kipling has created of the native ruler. The Amir of Kabul is known to history as the Iron Amir, given his strong ruling tactics that ultimately unified the Afghan State. However, Kipling praises the Amir and later on discredits him by branding him as a barbarian who rules by terror. He even designates the whole Afghan nation as thieves and thoroughly rejects their self-righteous notion of honour.

While appreciating the role of Abdur Rehman in the contestation of the *Great Game*, Kipling notes that he is the trusted ally of the Empress of India,

¹⁰ Retrieved from <http://www.theotherpages.org/poems/kiplin10.html>, accessed on 10/04/2016

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Retrieved from <http://www.online-literature.com/kipling/lifes-handicap/6/>, accessed on 10/04/16

and a gentleman. And in his ruling style is as unaccountable as the gray wolf, which is his blood-brother.¹³

Kipling depicts the Afghan Amir as a heartless person who disregards justice and decides all matters on personal whims. His word is the ultimate law, which understandably might have operated well during the tribal socio-political milieu of Afghanistan at that time.

‘His word is red law; by the gust of his passion falls the leaf of man's life and his favor is terrible. ... This is personal government, as it was in the days of Harun al Raschid, of blessed memory, whose times exist still and will exist long after the English have passed away.’¹⁴

4. The Working of the Empire

Her Majesty's Servants (1894)¹⁵, a short story included in, *The Jungle Book* (1894), relates Kipling's favorite theme i.e. duty, discipline and obedience, all necessary ingredients to successfully build an empire. Here the animals talk to each other and Kipling records the discussion. The writer presumably understands their language and an interesting drama unfolds where the camels, elephants, bulls, horses and mules are engaged in different duties and comments, expressing their views.

It offers a glimpse of what Kipling so beautifully provided us in his *Jungle Books* (1894-1895), wherein animals vocally air their views and perceptions of the physical world around them as well as of humans who try to control them. While telling the story, Kipling is very particular to record the impact of the order and discipline of the British Army on the Afghan King. The spectacle is so threatening that the Amir seems to be going berserk and, given his ruthlessness, appears to be making ready to put to sword the English men and women. Kipling compares the disciplined and orderly British forces, even the animals employed in their service, with that of the Afghan army and takes pride in the superiority of the former.¹⁶

It seems appropriate to refer briefly to the organization of Russian Army and try to compare it to what Kipling praises in the British Indian Army during the era of the so-called Great Game, a period of high colonial contestations in Central Asia between the two empires. To begin with, the Tsar's military might evolved with the passage of time alongside the beginning of the Russian City state. Peter the Great organized the Russian army, taking officers from the aristocracy with Cossacks and serfs as

¹³ Retrieved from <http://www.telilib.com/authors/K/KiplingRudyard/prose/LifesHandicap/amirhomily.html>, accessed on 10/04/16

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Retrieved from <http://www.authorama.com/jungle-book-13.html>, accessed on 10/04/16

¹⁶ Retrieved from http://www.ciudadseva.com/sevacity/stories/en/kipling/her_majestys_servants.htm, accessed on 10/04/16

common soldiers. Conscription was practiced very strictly and even children were taken into military service. In this respect the Russian military organization, with infantry, cavalry, and artillery was quite compatible with the times. However it was the fateful Crimean War (1853-1856) against the combined forces of France, Britain and the Ottomans that exposed its internal weaknesses. Resultantly, efforts were made to reform the military apparatus by abolishing children's conscription and providing for military education to revamp the system.¹⁷

The tribal military organization of both Central Asian Khanates and that of the Afghan states was no match to the European armies of both Russia and England. A limited number of Russian soldiers routed Armies of Bukhara and Kokand.¹⁸

The most telling part of the story is when Kipling, praises the discipline of the British forces and even the animals employed in there service, in order to impress the Afghan Amir.

They obey, as the men do. Mule, horse, elephant, or bullock, he obeys his driver, and the driver his sergeant, and the sergeant his lieutenant, and the lieutenant his captain, and the captain his major, and the major his colonel, and the colonel his brigadier commanding three regiments, and the brigadier the general, who obeys the Viceroy, who is the servant of the Empress.¹⁹

In an interesting analysis, Scott Evan views that Russian military was designed on the Napoleonic model, with strong emphasis on regulations, which though worked well against the Central Asian Khanate, but failed in the Battle of Dargo (1845) in the Caucasus. They were not trained for the new type of adversary which exposed its internal vulnerability.²⁰ On the contrary, the British were adopting unconventional military tactics, vis-à-vis, asymmetrical warfare, command and control system, and use of technology. Russian military might was too strong for the decaying tribal military order of Central Asia, but compared to British military system, it was too unwieldy, as Bruce Menning notes: "...huge in size, ponderous in movement, unimaginative in leadership, and bound to an outmoded socio-economic system".²¹

¹⁷ Retrieved from http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/eng/Crimean_War, accessed on 28/05/2016

¹⁸ D, Encausse, H.C., Systematic Conquest, 1865 to 1884. In *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, edited by Allworth, E., Columbia University Press, New York 1967, p 133

¹⁹ Retrieved from

http://www.ciudadseva.com/sevacity/stories/en/kipling/her_majestys_servants.htm, accessed on 10/04/16

²⁰ Evans, S., *The Impact of Russian Military Systems and Nineteenth Century Russian Expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia*. Carleton University, Ontario 2014

²¹ Menning, B., *Bayonets Before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914*. Bloughton Indiana University, US 1992.

6. 'Wounded and Left on Afghanistan's Plains'

A Young British Soldier (1892)²² is a short but very relevant work. Kipling, also known to be Bard of the British Empire, loves to sing for its soldiers at war in alien territories. Issuing instructions and informed advice to the combatants in Afghanistan, Kipling warns of cholera in the camp, the tropical sun to avoid heat stroke, and of the infidelity of their wives. He also instructs not to wait for the dead comrades and move on holding on to the arms and the weapons without fear. In the end, when wounded, they should kill themselves with their own rifles before the Afghan women come out to cut them down. It is one of his numerous poems, Kipling wrote about common soldiers, their joys and sorrows, in great sympathy and empathy towards those soldiers of Empire, who become 'beggar-like' when no more required. That is why we meet many 'beggars' of Empire in Kipling's works, the soldiers who though respond quickly to the call of the Empire, but are forgotten soon afterwards.

Here, Kipling is referring to the bloody Anglo-Afghan War, which proved disastrous for both the people. Given his notions on Afghans especially their thirst for revenge, ironically one of Kipling's most important themes in fiction, advises the young British soldiers suggesting how to react to the brutality of the war. Kipling teaches and sings for these soldiers. It is with such works that Kipling has gained, at times, unbelievable relevance. Afghanistan is once again in the middle of big powers rivalry. Keeping in view, the contemporariness of Kipling's work, the last two of the thirteen stanzas of this particular poem are reproduced.

*When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.
Go, go, go like a soldier,
Go, go, go like a soldier,
Go, go, go like a soldier,
So-oldier of the Queen!*²³

7. Empire Building

The Man Who Would Be King (1888)²⁴ is one of Kipling's most famous works, a short story, thematically treating the subject, Empire-building. In an attempt to establish their own Kingdom, we find two white men proceeding

²² Retrieved from <http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/the-young-british-soldier/>

²³ Retrieved from http://www.poetryloverspage.com/poets/kipling/young_british_soldier.html, accessed on 10/04/16

²⁴ Kipling, R., *The Man Who Would Be King*. Retrieved from <http://www.readbookonline.net/readOnline/296/>

to Afghan Kafiristan²⁵ (now Nooristan). Daniel Dravot and Peachy Carnehan undertake the journey from India, hiding weapons in their baggage under the cover of the trading caravan to cross the border. They entered the Afghan territory disguised as Muslim holymen, which facilitated their uninterrupted journey. Though the two daring men fought bravely and overcame all possible hurdles. They brought warring tribes under one banner to provide a unified state, yet failed in realizing their dream of building an empire there. Since the local people considered them gods, the desire of Dravot to get married blew their cover. Resultantly, Dravot gets killed and his Commander-in-Chief, Peachy reaches Lahore, India, carrying in his bag, all the way from Kafiristan, the crowned head of Dravot, to tell his story to the world.²⁶

The source of the story has been traced to one of the most interesting adventurers of the 19th Century, having come from America to India and becomes governor of Gujrat at one time. Later on he travels to Afghanistan and gets the Amir's favour there and establishes his own kingdom at Ghaur.²⁷

Macintyre notes, 'Josiah Harlan, hereditary Prince of Ghor, died without family or fanfare. In this time, he had been Hallah Sahib Bahadur, friend of kings, warrior, alchemist, a poet, player of the Great Game.'²⁸ While comparing Harlan, the real life would-be-King with that of Kipling's Dravot who succeeds in establishing a Kingdom in Nooristan, it is interesting to note that another common factor was that both wanted to follow the foot prints of Alexander the Great. "I'll make an Empire...I am the son of Alexander by Queen Semiramis."²⁹

Like Harlan, who travelled far and wide in India, and Afghanistan, unbelievably achieving the highest possible status and influential positions at both the places, Kipling's Dravot and his deputy Peachy race to the highest posts, even establishing an empire of their own, while they were literally pariahs in India. The dying social, political and economic orders at both the places created a vacuum for such fortune-hunters, wanderers and adventurers and even mercenaries to capitalise. The two so-called 'ragtag'

²⁵ 'Kafiristan a territory of some five thousand square miles on the south slope of the Hindu Kush mountains between Afghanistan and Kashmir, and of strategic importance as an outpost of the Indian frontier, commanding as it does the passes of the Hindu Kush'. The Man Who Would Be King, notes on the text by John McGivering. http://www.kipling.org.uk/rg_wouldbeking_notes.htm accessed on 07.06.2008

²⁶ Retrieved from http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/rg_wouldbeking1.htm, accessed on 10.06.2016

²⁷ Retrieved from http://public.wsu.edu/~campbelld/engl372/kipling_man_who_would_be_king.pdf, accessed on 10.06.2016

²⁸ MacIntyre, B., *The Man Who Would be King, The first American in Afghanistan*. Farrar, Straus, New York 2004, p.286

²⁹ Kipling, R., *The Man Who Would Be King*. Retrieved from <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/8147/8147-h/8147-h.htm> accessed on 10/04/16

Anglo-Indians are depicted to be capable to stand at par with viceroys and kings, and even, as they boast, Alexander the Great. The point that Kipling makes here is that with military skill and weapon, one can race to unimaginable heights in the uncivilized world. The only fault that he finds in this whole arrangement is that Dravot, the would-be king, loses the moral authority of being a god to the people.

"I once came near to kinship with what might have been a veritable King, and was promised the reversion of a Kingdom--army, law-courts, revenue, and policy all complete..."³⁰

Since the target land is a soft one, and the two friends have sufficient knowledge of the area, supported by the maps which the narrator shares with them, they embark on a very dangerous sojourn, hoodwinking the border patrol between British India and Afghanistan in execution of the contract they had signed in the office of the narrator.

Sitting in Kipling's office, the two friends, Dravot and Peachy try to locate Kafiristan in the maps provided by him. Giving a down-to-earth roadmap of colonization, Dravot tells that if one knows how to drill and train a nation fighting each other, it is quite easy to rule them as a king. Maybe there is ironical undertone when Kipling mentions the way the two ex-servicemen consider empire-building. Presently, however, the main concern of the two would-be kings is to go there and train them in the art of war. This way they would be conquering one kingdom after another, having faith in their training, of which he proudly says. "See here!" said Dravot, his thumb on the map. "Up to Jagdallak, Peachey and me know the road. We were there with Robert's Army..."³¹

When the two adventurers, Dravot and Peachy, lost their Kingdom whose residents are considered by them to be of European decent, Kipling informs us how effective the role of weapon and soldiering is in the building of an Empire. These two ragtag loafers, the social outcasts of Anglo-India, who call themselves 'betwixt and between' fail to sustain the Kingdom despite their successful use of the tool of violence enforcing colonialism in that remote corner of Afghanistan.

"I won't make a Nation,' says he. 'I'll make an Empire! These men aren't niggers; they're English! ... Two hundred and fifty thousand men, ready to cut in on Russia's right flank when she tries for India!"³²

Kipling tries to explore the weaknesses of the King, the ideal leader and the Hubris of empire-building when the two Englishmen succeed in establishing their own dynasty. Their adventure failed, Kipling warns because of a misplaced pride to be an equal to Queen Victoria before they

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Kipling, R., *The Phantom Rickshaw, The Man Who Would Be King*. Retrieved from <http://www.telelib.com/authors/K/KiplingRudyard/prose/PhantomRickshaw/manwhowouldbeking.html>, accessed on 10/04/16

³² Ibid

establish themselves fully in the alien world where natives fought each other over petty matters and had no system to regulate their lives. The two main characters, Dravot and Peachy, succeed in their mission to build themselves a kingdom in the exotic high land but could not succeed to sustain the same as planned. To quote Edward Said:

‘... a sort of uncontested normative judgment about India and its rulers is Kipling’s way of demonstrating that natives accept colonial rule, so long as it is the right kind of rule. Historically this has always been the way European imperialism made itself more palatable to itself, for what could be better for its self-image than native subjects who express assent to the outsider’s knowledge and power, while implicitly accepting European judgment on the undeveloped, backward or degenerate nature of native society?’³³

This story contains many references to British history and its relevance to Afghanistan with a clear verdict on how empires ought to be built. The two protagonists in this classic short story draw their strength from English history, which is why we find such Eurocentric references like “Robert’s Army”, the army of General Roberts which reduced the Afghan forces and emerged as the hero of Qandahar during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880). The heroes of this tale identify themselves with the locals when they note their complexion and consider them to be ‘related to us English’. Similarly there is mention of “the Khaibar”, “Ghorband” and more interestingly “the lost tribes”, which is, one of the theories on the Pakhtun’s origin as an ethnic group. Kipling also refers to the Great Game politics in which, he, like any Englishmen feared the invasion of “Russia’s right flank where she tries for India”. An interesting mention is that of the War of Independence of 1857, called by the English, Rebellion or the Sepoy Mutiny, the character in this story referred to as “our Fifty-Seven”, when they felt threatened by the local people.

Conclusion

Kipling’s views on the Afghan Kingdom is ‘Orientalised’ and his Imperial perspective demands civilizing the non-white, native people and cultures. Rudyard Kipling’s view of Afghanistan and the ruling style of its Amirs, most importantly that of Amir Abdur Rehman, is evidently prejudiced. Considering Afghanistan as a hell for the British forces during the Anglo-Afghan War, Kipling forewarns of the dangers awaiting the imperialist soldiers. He was hopeful that the British Indian soldiers would be gloriously victorious but history bequeathed its verdict otherwise. Kipling’s perception of Afghanistan is as partisan as his perception of the Russians during the 19th century *Great Game*, and later, of the Germans during World

³³ Said, E. *Introduction to Rudyard Kipling, Kim*. Penguin Books, UK 1989.

War I, since for him, they all threatened the British Empire. However, one cannot help but reflect on the parallelism in Kipling's works to today's turbulent situation in the region, with Afghanistan once again in the thick of things. Kipling, therefore, viewed the whole situation within the colonial paradigm. In, *The Man Who Would Be King*, particularly, Kipling advocated empire and empire-building, to advance civilizing humanitarian mission forewarning those of the pitfalls awaiting them who follow their whims instead of moral authority to rule.

Pursuing a literary perspective of some of his works relating to Afghanistan, this paper has identified Kipling of holding a racially biased view of the Afghan Emirate. It is irony of history that Kipling appears relevant even in contemporary environment of Afghanistan and Central Asia. To him Afghanistan is exotic and its ruling elite ruthless and corrupt in contrast to the civilized elite of the Raj. That Kabul town (not colony) is a hell when compared with the glory of British India (imperial colony), has been a typical 'Orientalist misrepresentation.' Kipling's view of the Afghan people and its political system, with special reference to the ruling style of Amir Abdul Rehman, is stereotypical. During the Great Game of the nineteenth Century, and with particular reference to the Second Anglo-Afghan War, Kipling's verdict is politically charged. His issuance of warning to British soldiers in Afghanistan, in the works under discussion seems an expression of genuine worries about their destiny. However his haughty praise for the highly organized and disciplined British Indian army, compared to that of the traditional military organization of Afghanistan smells predisposition too.

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MODERN STATE, TRIBALISM AND THE CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY: THE EMERGENCE OF RELIGIOUS ELITES IN AFGHANISTAN DURING 1880-1973

Ghulam Shams-ur-Rehman*

Abstract

The present paper aims to study the Afghan society where a particular shift in authority patterns has been observed with the establishment of modern National State of Afghanistan under Amir Abd al-Rahman in 1880. The Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan were historically independent and autonomous and they did not remain under any central commanding authority. The authority traditionally rested in the hand of tribal chiefs who resolved the socio-political matters through jirga in the light of customary law pashtunwali. The central government introduced reforms which were focused to reduce the traditional authority of the tribal chiefs. The central government also used the religion for national cohesion among the autonomous tribes. The use of religion for the project of nationalism brought the religious class into the politics. Thus, the religious class gained more authority both on national and tribal basis in all socio-political spheres. The present research argues that the traditional authority patterns were significantly changed with the establishment National State of Afghanistan. The weak central government remained failed in achieving national cohesion through the projection of religion. However, these reforms ended up with the emergence of religious elites in national politics. A special attention has been paid to the episode of Amir Aman Allah and his reforms in order to show how the religious class consolidated its authority during his rule and in subsequent regimes became permanent feature of political system.

Key Words: Modern State of Afghanistan, Nationalism in Afghanistan, Pan-Islamic Movement, *Pashtunwali*, Pashtun tribalism, Amir Abd al-Rahman, Amir Aman Allah Khan, Authority Patterns in Afghan Society.

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Introduction

The present research is a systematic study of the change happened in the authority pattern in Afghan society with the establishment of National State of Afghanistan in 1880. Amir Abd al-Rahman, the founder of modern Afghanistan, started the nation-building project. The central government, since then, attempted to reduce the authority of tribal chiefs. The central government used Islam in order to extend its power over the Pashtun rural tribes and to coerce them to follow the rule of central government *vis-à-vis* the *pashtunwali* code particularly in relation to the affairs of the state. The state's use of Islam ultimately ended up with the appearance/ inclusion of religious class in political arena. The state also made compulsory conscriptions for security and defence of the frontiers. Similarly, implementation of tax and its collection made the rural tribes hostile towards the government. The low collection of revenue always compelled the Afghan governments to rely upon the foreign assistance which remained the main impediment in the way of independence. On the other hand, the tribal chiefs revolted against the reform of central government, and rural mullahs generally endorsed the plea of tribal chiefs. Consequently, the religious leadership gained more power in both the central and rural spheres of authority. Therefore, state's use of Islam for the establishment of central government backfired and religious leadership rose up to high prominence, and attempted to gain more share in national politics. Shahrani rightly analysed: "these experiences provided new opportunities for the exercise of political power by the religious leaders in addition to their traditional exemplary, moral and spiritual authority among the population. This development has generally worked against the centralizing aims of the state."¹

Amir Abd al-Rahman, in order to reduce the tribal power, forced thousands of Ghilzai Pashtuns to migrate from southern and south-central Afghanistan to north of Hindu Kush. With this strategy, he not only minimised the influence of the Ghilzais in the region, where they were in conflict with the Durrani, but also established his own power in northern Afghanistan through dwelling the Pashtuns in non-Pashtun areas. Dupree writes: "Abdur Rahman accomplished two immediate aims: he removed dissidents from areas which they might again infect with the germs of revolt, and he created a force loyal to himself, for, although the Ghilzai (Pashtun) might be anti-Durrani (Pashtun) while living in their own territorial tribal zone, they were pro-Pashtun in the northern non-Pashtun (Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkoman) areas."²

¹ Shahrani, Nazif M., Afghanistan: State and Society in Retrospect, in *The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism*, ed. Ewan W. Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree. Printer Publishers, London 1990, pp. 41-49, at p. 47.

² Dupree, Louis., *Afghanistan*: Princeton University Press, Princeton 1980, p. 419.

According to Abd al-Rahman's own account, he compelled hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers to migration in order to purge the feudal and tribal system, and to develop one grand community under a single rule of central government.³ He did not tolerate any opposition of religious leaders and suppressed them with an *iron* hand. He brought religious leadership of mullahs and Sufis under the government payroll and took religious endowments (*waqf*) into the government custody.⁴ However, his successor, Amir Habib Allah Khan (r. 1901-1919) granted a liberty to the religious leadership by which they gained more authority not only in religious matters but also they influenced government for their political and international affairs.⁵

Amir Aman Allah's Call of *Jihad*

Amir Aman Allah is considered a revolutionary and reformist ruler of Afghanistan. He consolidated his power by proclaiming the war of independence against the British domination. According to a treaty with British government, Afghanistan could not constitute its independent foreign policy. In April 1919, Aman Allah's call of *jihad* for liberation from the Britain gave him authority and credibility to win the support of religious and tribal forces of the Pashtuns, albeit they favoured his uncle's bid for power. His successful moves resulted on the Treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919, which recognized Afghanistan as a sovereign state. This victory, on the other hand, produced financial unrest as the British stopped its subsidy payments.⁶ Aman Allah appointed his father-in-law Mahmud Tarzi foreign minister and successfully managed to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1920. As a result, he successfully secured some concession from the British in a new treaty in 1921.⁷

Through a successful diplomacy, Aman Allah not only formulated legitimacy to his rule domestically but also presented himself as a victor across the Muslim world. The World War II brought new perspectives of socio-political reforms. Aman Allah's desire to save the Ottoman Empire from the disintegration led him to support the Pan-Islamism, and Khilafat

³ Wilber, Donald Newton., *Afghanistan: Its People, its Society, its Culture*. New Haven 1962, p 9.

⁴ Faiz Muhammad, Katib, *Siraj al-Tawarikh*, (Kabul: Matba'ah-i-Hurufi Dar al-Saltanah, 1331-1333[1912-1914].) Vol. 3, p. 475.

⁵ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 430.

⁶ Poullada, Leon B. Political Modernization in Afghanistan The Aman Allah Reforms, in *Afghanistan Some New Approaches*, eds. George Grassmuck, Ludwig W. Adamec, and Frances H. Irwin, (University of Michigan: 1969), p. 108

⁷ See for details: Adamec, Ludwig W. *Afghanistan 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 109-163; Ghobar, M.G.M. *Afghanistan dar Massir-e-Tarikh*, (Afghanistan in the way of history), (Kabul: Muassesa-Chap-i-Kutub (Book Printing Institute), 1346/1967), pp. 756-784; Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 446,

movement of India.⁸ He also supported the *basmach*i resistance movement against the Soviet Russia.⁹ Due to his pan-Islamic rhetoric, the conservative religious clerics awarded him the title of *ghazi* (a victor of holy war). However, within a couple of year, both the Pan-Islamic movement and the Khilafat movement of India lost their dynamism, when Mustafa Kamal Pasha abolished the *khilafat* in 1924. At the same time, Russia compelled Aman Allah to stop the support of *basmach*i after the inclusion of Bukhara and Khiva into the Soviet Union in 1920.¹⁰ Aman Allah soon realized that his ambitious Pan-Islamic thoughts were not viable in new changing context. Then he focused his attention on the domestic reforms. His most significant contribution towards the domestic reforms was the formation of the constitution in 1923.¹¹

Amir Aman Allah and his Reforms for Modernization

Aman Allah's endeavour to modernize Afghan society was seen with suspicion. The Pashtun tribes considered his social, legal and administrative reforms as a threat to their autonomy and independence. They perceived the reforms a kind of interference in their socio-cultural and customary law: *pashtunwali*. Therefore, it can be observed that the eastern Pashtun reacted furiously against these reforms as they saw their traditional system in danger. Therefore, a rebellion started among the Pashtun tribes of Khost in 1924. Barfield argues that although the reforms were disparaged and criticized on religious grounds as anti-Islamic but actually it was the protest of tribal authorities against the reforms of central government, which were focused to reduce the tribal autonomy though implementation of new tax system, conscription and family laws.¹²

⁸ Barfield, Thomas, *Afghanistan A Cultural and Political History*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 182.

⁹ Poullada, Political Modernization in Afghanistan, p. 110; Fletcher, Arnold, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 201.

¹⁰ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 447-448.

¹¹ Nawid summarized his achievement: "These regulations laid the foundation for ambitious administrative, legal, financial, and social reforms. Administrative functions were better organized and centralized. A new tax law was introduced, and the legal system unified. Social reforms included the abolition of slavery; expansion of the educational system, including formal education for women and reformation of the mosque schools; the imposition of universal conscription; and attempts to curtail polygamy, child marriage, and Pashtun customs relating to the treatment of women. Family matters were defined by a written uniform code of statutory laws." Nawid, Senzil K., *Religious Response to Social Change in Afghanistan 1919-29 King Aman-Allah and the Afghan Ulama*, (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 1999), p. 81.

¹² Barfield, *Afghanistan*, p. 183.

Aman Allah already had lost the long-standing British subsidies in his ambition to war of independence. Therefore, he revised the Tax system increasing the existing taxes and introducing some new taxes in order to enforce his social and educational reforms. He also deducted the stipends previously paid to the Muhammadzai elites and religious leaders. Moreover, civil servants had the authority to collect revenue which was previously collected by the village head. The new system was not properly enforced that discredited the integrity of the regime and caused in the reduction of the revenue because of the corruption of tax collectors.¹³

Reaction of Religious Scholar on Aman Allah's Reforms

The rural religious class criticised all those reforms which could undermine their traditional authority prescribed by the *pashtunwali*. Particularly, they rejected all those educational reforms of Aman Allah that were introduced in order to build up Afghanistan under his project of modernisation. Aman Allah introduced a compulsory uniform training for *qazis* through a prescribed new legal curriculum. He also founded *Maktab-i-Quzat* (school for Judges) in 1923 in order to train judges who can integrate the modern legal insights into the religious understanding. On the basis of legal credentials, a candidate had to appear before a secular board of examiners for the appointment as a *qazi* in the courts. The traditional religious establishment objected and criticised these training and selection procedures.¹⁴

Barfield argues that the utmost element of the Pathans pride had been their personal autonomy and adherence to *pashtunwali*. They did not accept any interference by any state or local community in their personal domestic affairs. The marriage laws were perceived by the Pashtuns and other Afghans as interference in their private matters. On the other hand, Afghan government was not powerful enough to structure and impose social change under its modernisation modal at local level as the Soviet Union reformed central Asian states or Ottomans and Kamal did in Turkey.¹⁵

The rural clergies protested more furiously, when Aman Allah took the local mosque schools under the direct domain of central government which until that time had been under the exclusive control of the mullahs. The curriculum of mosque schools was focused on the religious education. In order to standardise the education of mosque school, the Ministry of Education designed training workshops for local mullah to introduce new

¹³ Poullada, Leon B., *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Aman Allah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 131-136; Barfield, *Afghanistan*, p. 183.

¹⁴ Nawid, , *Religious Response to Social Change*, p. 92.

¹⁵ Barfield, *Afghanistan*, p. 185.

teaching methods. Furthermore, a board of examiner was appointed to evaluate the students of mosque schools. The board had to monitor them periodically.¹⁶ Aman Allah sought the cooperation of the influential *shaykhs* for his educational and military reforms. Mullah of Sarkani—a prominent scholar— and other high-class *‘ulama* endorsed the validity of Aman Allah’s reforms regarding education and conscription,¹⁷ but they criticised the government policies about women education. Aman Allah opened a girls’ school (*maktab-i-masturat*) in Kabul in 1920. There were heated debates between the mullahs and government officials on the issue of women education: whether it was permitted in Islam or prohibited. *Siraj al-Akhbar* and *Ershad-i-Niswan* documented some of them.¹⁸ The mullahs argued that the women were not allowed to be seen outside while the female education in public school would be culminated to their appearance in the public place.

Peoples’ resentments on the social reforms of Aman Allah were more serious than his economical reforms. His reforms for the emancipation of women were perceived as anti-religious and anti-normative. The reforms discouraged the polygamy and banned the child engagement and the exchange of women for settling blood feuds. Similarly, the custom of marriage payments was restricted.¹⁹ The rural mullahs also rejected the social reforms regarding the women status, marriage, child marriage and polygamy. The focus of these reforms was to eliminate un-Islamic traditions, and to enforce the Islamic legal system. Logically the religious class should extend their support at least to those reforms which uphold the *shari‘ah* stance versus cultural tradition. For instance, the Marriage Code of 1920, and Marriage Code of 1923 were based on the principles of *hanafi* law. The Marriage Code of 1920 describes the rules of child marriage, bridal price, and extravagant weddings. The Marriage Code 1923 was introduced to regulate the child marriage, according to which the registration of marriage was necessary, while it was not allowed to register any marriage where the bride had not reached the age of puberty. Similarly, the state had fixed the dowry at 30 rupees for all citizens, which was previously determined by the tribal and family status. The Code also prohibited the *shir-baha* (literally meaning milk money, traditionally all types of gifts given to the bride’s father), *toyana* (wedding expenses), and *walwar* (bridal money). The Code

¹⁶ *Nezam Nama-e-Maktab-e-Khanagi* (Regulation regarding Private Schools), (Kabul: Government Press, 1302/1923).

¹⁷ Note: Nawid mentioned: “On January 13, 1923, *Ettehad-i-Mashriqi* published an appeal for support of education endorsed by Sarkani Molla and signed by a number of notables in Konar. "OR,L/P&S/10/1081,P1054, no. 6, Feb. 7, 1924." cf. *Religious Response to Social Change*, p. 94.

¹⁸ cf. *Seraj al-Akhbar-e- Afghaniyah* (The Lamp of the News of Afghanistan), Editor in chief: Mahmud Tarzi, Vol. 3, No. 10, Dalw, 8, 1292/Jan. 28, 1913.

¹⁹ Pazhwak, Abd al-Rahman, *Taamulat-Huquqiyya wa Jaziya-i-Milli*, (National Legal Transaction), Salnama-Kabul (Kabul Almanac) 1318 Sh.H/1939, p. 250.

also discouraged the polygamy. It was argued with a Quranic reference: 4:3 that the second marriage was allowed only out of necessity when the husband could do justice between his wives.²⁰ Therefore, the would-be husband had to justify and prove the ability to do justice with wives in the court by presenting two witnesses. Child marriage and polygamy provoked heated debates and strong opposition of rural clergies. They publicly criticised these rules and declared that the reforms were a kind of reprehensible innovation. Actually they did not seriously judge the rules rather they rejected the complete set of reforms. Barfield views that the women reforms and marriage laws were not seriously studied by many scholars and people made their opinion on the basis of inflammatory rumours. They feared that the state would undermine their traditional rights and customs prescribed in Islam and *pashtunwali*.²¹

Aman Allah's reforms for the systematic codification of Islamic law and its application and implementation through a central organised judiciary, infuriated the tribal mullahs as these reforms reduced the role of mullah as arbitrator and interpreter of Islamic legal and religious matters. On the other hand, the central government aimed to gain more control over the tribal and religious authorities through promulgation of new Penal Code and the Criminal Law, which rejected many customary practices of the *pashtunwali*. This situation was certainly not in the favour of the religious class. It affected the position of rural mullahs. They never wanted to change the status quo as "the mullah's function in tribal areas was prescribed by the *pashtunwali*. Change in the tribal way of life would mean changes in the mullahs' role and influence."²² Moreover, a written Criminal Code also undermined the position of tribal chiefs because previously they had the authority to resolve the disputes on the basis of justification and adjustment as prescribed in the *pashtunwali*; whereas the judicial reforms conferred the authority to the *qazis* appointed by the central government to implement the written rule and regulation of the Penal and Criminal Codes.

The implementation of Fundamental Law also infuriated the religious class as it conferred the equal position to all citizens before law, regardless of their creed. In order to integrate and invoke the national spirit in the minorities, Aman Allah reduced the poll tax (*jizya*) on the Hindus. The Hindus were supposed to wear a specific dress e.g. yellow turban to distinguish themselves from the Muslims. Aman Allah lifted all these kinds

²⁰ Q. 4:3 reads "If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, Marry women of your choice, two or three or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess, that will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice." Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. The Holy Quran (Koran), (Saudi Arabia: King Fahd Holy Quran Printing Complex, 1978), p. 34.

²¹ Barfield, *Afghanistan*, 185.

²² Nawid, *Religious Response to Social Change*, p. 92.

of conditions, and granted them right to buy property, join military training, and build their temples. All these reforms enraged the religious class as they believed that the *shari'ah* made a clear distinction between the rights of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Aman Allah's constitutional and educational reforms were criticized but according to Nawid, "the real challenge" came from the rural clergies who infused the revolts with passionate Islamic rhetoric in Southern Afghanistan particularly in Kandahar, Khost, Ghazni and Zurmat. A rebellion broke out in Khost when religious clergies managed to convince the tribal chiefs against the government. Mullah Abd Allah- an ex-*qazi* of Southern provinces who had lost his post due to legal reforms- with the collaboration of Mangal and Zadran tribes organised a militant rebellion in the name of Islam. Actually the Mangal and Zadran tribes were displeased with Aman Allah's conscription policy, because they had been previously exempted from conscription; now they were not enjoying such an exemption.

*With the new code in one hand and the Koran in the other, they called the tribes to choose between the word of God and that of man, and adjured them to resist demands, the acceptance of which would reduce their sons to slavery in the Afghan army and their daughters to the degrading influence of Western education.*²³

The Khost revolt reached to its zenith, when Abd al-Karim son of exiled Amir Yaqub Khan who ruled Afghanistan in 1878 for five months, left India and joined the rebellion movement in Khost. Most of the Zadran and Mangal tribal chiefs rendered their allegiance to him. Many powerful Ghilzais also joined this movement when Abdul Karim declared that he would govern justly with the council of forty '*ulama*. Rebel army defeated the royal army, and marched towards Kabul. Aman Allah propagated that the insurgency was a British plot designed to control Afghanistan. With the support of neighbouring tribes of Kabul, he crushed the insurgency and restored the rite of the government.²⁴

Composition of *Loya Jirga* and the Rising Role of '*Ulama* in Socio-Political Affairs

Aman Allah called the *loya jirga* (Grand General Assembly) in July 16, 1924 in Paghman — Aman's summer capital. About 1054 delegates from across the country gathered to discuss socio-political and religious situation and government's reforms and their implications. The high-ranking '*ulama* were either the members of the High Religious Council (*Haiat-e tamiz*) or well-established sheikhs and '*ulama* in their region. The High Religious

²³ Nawid, *Religious Response to Social Change*, pp. 99, 101, 104.

²⁴ Barfield, *Afghanistan*, pp. 186, 187.

Council was consisted upon two different types of *'ulama*: the Madrasah Shahi-trained and Deobandi-trained. The *'ulama* of High Religious Council had justified the reforms of Aman Allah on the basis of the principle of limited interpretation (*ijtihad-i muqayyad*), while the high-ranking clergies favoured the crown through their silent support. However, during the *jirga*, some *'ulama* of High Religious Council offended the *Nezam-Namas* and argued that it was at variance with the *hanafi* jurisprudence, whereas the high-ranking *ulama* not only objected reforms but also criticised the formation of High Religious Council. The *jirga* ended up with the declaration that Islam was official religion of Afghanistan. The fundamental Law was revised according to which minorities were liable to pay the poll-tax (*jizya*). Similarly, the provisions regarding the restriction on the second marriage, child marriage were removed from the Marriage Law. The formation of the Association of the *'ulama* of Afghanistan (*Jamiyyat-i Ulama-i Afghanistan*) was recommended on each district level which would monitor the religious activities and command the good and prevent the bad. (*amr bi-al-ma'ruf wa-nahi 'an al-munkir*). Furthermore, the formation of seven members committee of *ulama* was recommended, who had a *de facto* veto in all political matters. The urban scholars expressed their long-repressed misgivings about the laws and emphasized to reformulate them according to the *hanafi* jurisprudence. Moreover, the traditional *qazi*-judge system would not be replaced by the new state legal system. They, furthermore, demanded to end the restriction on polygamy, and to restore the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. On the assurance of these amendments, they declared their allegiance to the *amir* and validated his reform regarding tax system and conscription. They also recommended harsh punishment for traitors and rebel clergies. The internal and external threats to the regime compelled Aman Allah to compromise with conservative clergy by rolling back some of his social reforms but maintaining administrative reforms.²⁵

Aman Allah restored his legitimacy as a monarch by winning the allegiance of religious leaders through accepting their demands in a turbulent time. On the other hand, the high-ranking *'ulama* supported the crown and presented themselves as arbitrator between the state and rebel mullahs, but at the same time, they showed their concerns regarding the modernization reforms publicly and compelled the monarch to accept their religious conservative authority and recommendations. It was, in a way a major setback to Aman Allah's programme of modernization. However, the high ranking mullahs publicly support the king and justified their allegiance to him. For instance, Mullah of Chaknawur delivered Friday sermon, and declared that the *nizam-namas* was now being brought into full conformity

²⁵ Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion*, pp. 92-96.

with the *shari'at*. The mullahs also passed a *fatwa* in the favour of the regime.²⁶

Nawid argues that the events of 1924 affirmed the role of religious leadership as power broker and guardians of Islam. Likewise, the liberal and enlightened *ulama* represented by the Kandahari could not sustain their innovative ideas before the rebellion of conservative religious rural leadership. All these events had a grave impact on Aman Allah. He made up his mind that the religious leadership was the major obstacle in the way of progress. He became convinced that the clergies were narrow minded and would not accept any idea which was not according to their traditional methodology. Therefore, when he successfully suppressed the rebellion, he began to reassert his authority. He started to dismiss eminent mullahs from their positions such as the dismissal of Mawlawi Abd al-Rahman Baiktuti, the Grand Qazi of Kabul. He also expelled Nur al-Mashaikh, the spiritual leader of Mujaddidi Naqshbandi Order, from the country because of his suspicious involvement in the Khost rebellion, and his strict position on the issue of child marriage and polygamy. Nur al-Mashaikh settled in Dera Ismail Khan. He later became the spiritual leader of the Order after the death of his elder brother Shams al-Mashaikh, and organised vigorously anti-government campaign on both sides of the border.²⁷

A Weak Central Government and Consolidation of Religious Elites

Aman Allah made a long trip to Europe and some other countries from November 1927 to June 1928. He visited Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Iran, India and Egypt. He established great diplomatic and bilateral relation with these countries to take benefits from their technological development and modernisation.²⁸ He convened a *loya jirga* on his return from the trip and invited one thousand representatives from across the country. He was intended to bring radical reforms in the Afghan society through establishing religious institutions, eradicating the traditional

²⁶ The *fatwa* reads: "We *ulama* of the *Loya jirga* have corrected the few infirm provisions that had been included in the *nezam-namas* through the approval of the *ulama* advising the king and have brought them into line with Hanafi law.... We *ulama*, *satat*, and *mashayikh*, on behalf of the participants of the *jirga*, declare that whoever either by personal choice or encouragement of other would rise up against the State, the *ulu al-amr* has the right by authority of *shari'at* to impose any type of punitive measure which he feels appropriate. We, the *ulama*, *satat*, and *mashayikh* and delegates are ready to sacrifice our lives to suppress the traitors who have left their black imprints on the proud history of the Afghan nation." Nawid, *Religious Response to Social Change*, p. 113; *Ruydad-i-Guzarshat-e-Loya Jirga-e-Dar al-Saltana-Paghman, 1303, (Report on the Loya jirga of 1303/1924)*, (Kabul: War Ministry Press, 1303/1924), pp. 347-348.

²⁷ Nawid, *Religious Response to Social Change*, pp. 112-134.

²⁸ Wild, Roland, *Aman Allah: Ex-King of Afghanistan*, (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1932), p. 5; Fraser-Tytler, Sir W. Kerr, *Afghanistan: A Study of Political Development in Central Asia*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 207.

authority of mullah and tribal chief. He clearly announced: "I am compelled to say that the great secret of progress for our country lies in discarding old outworn ideas and customs, and as the proverb goes, march with the times."²⁹ He introduced his democratic plan for the formation of an assembly (*shura-i-melli*), which was to be elected by the people directly without the intervention or mediation of mullah and tribal chief. In the *jirga*, laws for the establishment of National Assembly, modern Courts System, and laws for education, and women emancipation were devised and approved by the representatives of the *loya jirga*. Presumably, he did not call many traditional mullahs in the *jirga* as he alluded in his later speech:

*This year's jirga was better than the previous ones, as many useful matters settled. It is all due to the fact that the representatives had been elected directly by the people and sheikhs, mollahs and khans had nothing to do with them.*³⁰

Aman Allah had become conscious that the religious leadership was a stumbling block in the way of modernization. Thus, he removed many religious scholars from their traditional positions in the government. He also banished the Deoband-trained *ulama* from Afghanistan and declared that they were an instrument of foreign intrigue who desired to stand against the state's endeavour of nation-building. He asserted that the same group had so vociferously criticised the *nezam-namas* of the *loya-jirga* of 1924. Aman Allah also criticized the *pirs*, and *pir-murid* system, and their networks in Indo-Afghan frontier region, which according to him, caused confusion in the region. He actually referred to Nur al-Mashaikh who resided in Dera Isamil Khan and had numerous adherents in Ghilzai tribes and high-ranking officers of army and administration. The '*ulama* protested against the revolutionary reforms of *loya jirga* of 1928. Some influential '*ulama* such as Akhudzada Hamid Allah of Tagaw advised Aman Allah to cancel the radical reforms but he was determined to enforce them. The '*ulama* gathered in the Mujaddidiyyah *khaneqah* in Shurbazar to devise their strategy in order to play their historic role as custodian of religion. The nephew of Nur al-Mashaikh and eldest son of Shams al-Mashaikh Fazal Rahim issued a *fatwa* signed by four hundred '*ulama* confirming that the king violated the *shari'ah* and that he was a heretic. Therefore, he was no longer to be obeyed. The '*ulama* took the *fatwa* to the southern provinces in order to instigate the tribes against the state. Many renowned scholars including Mawlawi Najam al-Din of Qataghan northern Afghanistan dropped the name of Aman Allah

²⁹ Gregorian, Vartan, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 259.

³⁰ Aman-e-Afghan, (news paper) (Kabul, Oct 6, 1928) in Nawid, *Religious Response to Social Change*, p. 139.

from the Friday *khutbah*.³¹

The rural population was not much awarded by the reforms of central government. The lack of communication between the central government and peasant class created a vacuum. Whereas the tribal chiefs and mullahs in that scenario, had been more influential to manipulate their agenda, particularly when the central government reforms apparently were formed to bring a social change within the existing social framework. Therefore, they instigate the public against the reforms such as three years compulsory military service, wearing of suits and hats and most importantly women and family laws which they perceived as a threat to their traditional tribal social structure. On the other hand, urban population was not satisfied with the new monetary system and corrupt administration. Thus the reforms failed to gather much receptivity among the masses. The '*ulama*'s appeal against the conscription and women's emancipation presented through religious idioms and socio-cultural concept of *namus* which easily convinced the male dominated Afghan society. A rebellion movement started in November 1928 across the country and culminated to the abduction of Aman Allah in January 14, 1929. Contrary to the previous rebellions, this time, high-ranking '*ulama* and the Mujaddidi *shaykhs* of Kabul (the Hazrat of Shurbazar) challenged the legitimacy of the monarch. However, they organised the rebellion movements in the rural areas from where they gained the strength that enabled them to compel the monarch on abduction.³²

Nadir Khan, Zahir Khan Confirming the Authority of Religious Elites

The Shinwari Pashtun burned down the Kings' palace and British Consulate in Jalalabab. Aman Allah sent royal army to suppress the revolt, but most of the regular troops deserted to join the rebels. Observing the vulnerability of Kabul, a Tajik leader of Kohistan Amir Habib Allah Kalakani known as Bacha Saqqao (son of water-carrier) attacked on Kabul and deposed Aman Allah. The religious leadership supported Muhammad Nadir Khan (r. 1929-33) against the Tajik Amir for the control of Kabul. Fazal Umar, the Mujadidi Hazrat of Shurbazar— a leading religious leader inspired particularly the rural Pashtuns of southern and eastern Afghanistan to assist Nadir Khan in his revolt against Kabul. Thus, Nadir Khan overthrew the Amir Habib Allah Kalakani after nine months of his rule of Kabul.³³

Nadir Khan attempted to maintain equilibrium between the tribal and

³¹ Nawid, *Religious Response to Social Change*, pp. 145, 154, 155.

³² Barfield, *Afghanistan*, pp. 190, 191; Wild, *Aman Allah*, p. 69; Haroon, Sana, *Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1988), pp. 120-123; Nawid, *Religious Response to Social Change*, pp. 190, 191.

³³ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 452, 453.

religious forces undermining the enthusiastic efforts of modernisation of his predecessor Amir Aman Allah.³⁴ *Loya jirga* validated his legitimacy to the accession to throne. Nadir Khan abolished all reforms of Aman Allah through a *farman* (ordinance). Thus, religious leadership attained more authority and power in political affairs. Nadir Khan was mainly supported by the rural tribal Pashtun and assisted by the Pashtun tribesmen from along the frontiers with British India. They also supported Nadir Khan, when Purdel- a Kohistani Tajik, revolted in July 1930. Nadir Khan suppressed that revolt with the help of these tribesmen and Purdel was killed in the fighting.³⁵ Nadir Khan's attacks on Amir Habib Allah Khan and Purdel also reflect internal ethnic hostility of Afghans society.

Nadir Khan was murdered in 1933 but his son Muhammad Zahir Shah continued the policies of his late father. Zahir Shah, then 19, became king but in the following decades, the country was run by his three uncles, Hashim Khan, prime minister of the country from 1933-1946, Shah Mahmud, prime minister of Afghanistan from 1946-1953 and Shah Wali, served as Minister to England and France from 1930-1947 and ambassador to Pakistan in 1947-1948. This is called the avuncular period of rule from 1933-1953. They principally maintained the status quo and traditional structure, particularly regarding the rural areas. Thus, they achieved a certain degree of peace and tranquillity.³⁶

In 1953, there was an internal conflict in the royal family. The inability of avuncular rule to initiate suitable reforms for modernisation culminated to the emergence of a new troika. Zahir Shah and his two first cousins General Muhammad Daud and Sardar Muhammad Naim Khan (sons of Sardar Muhammad Aziz, who assassinated in Berlin in 1933) appeared on the Afghan political horizon. Daud played a central role as a prime minister of the country for a decade from 1953-1963. He brought dynamic reforms, and reduced the influence of religious leadership in the secular affairs through introducing the secular education system, and revising the structure of judiciary and judicial codes on the basis of secular codified law. The growing influence of secular public institutions also weakened the influence of Mullah's mosque-*madrassa* schools.³⁷ Dupree argues that the Afghan Army also assisted the central government to reduce the power of religious leadership. He writes that "the army remained relatively weak, however, and conservative tribal and religious leaders were one of the foundations of power in Afghanistan from 1929-1953, when the army finally came into its

³⁴ Smith, Harvey H., *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*, (Washington, D.C: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1969), p. 177.

³⁵ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 460.

³⁶ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, pp. 477-498.

³⁷ Smith, *Area Handbook*, p. 157.

own.”³⁸ Daud initiated reforms on the pattern of Aman Allah. In 1959, he with his brother Naim Khan, Deputy Prime Minister, other members of royal family and high-ranking army officers appeared with their wives and daughter in the second day of the week-long celebrations of independence from the British control of Afghan foreign affairs after the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919). Contrary to the Afghan tradition, the women did not veil in the celebrations. This was the symbolic step taken by the government for its comprehensive social reforms. They also opposed secular education and land reforms. The same story of Aman Allah's episode was repeated; the religious leadership reacted against the social reforms regarding the women emancipation, secular education, and land reforms. They accused that the government wanted to pervert the nation with its anti-Islamic, atheistic reforms of communists and western Christians.³⁹ Daud reforms brought significant changes in the urban life of the country. With the financial assistance of Russia, Daud started the process of industrialisation of the country. Many projects ranging from the construction of new factories, motor roads, irrigation and power were initiated. Similarly, freedom of expression developed the public conscious level of the urban population regarding political issues.

In the early 1960, Zahir Shah focused on the constitutional reforms. Muhammad Daud resigned from his post and Muhammad Yusuf became prime minister of the country- first prime minister not from the royal family. A new constitution was drafted and passed by the *loya jirga* in 1964. According to new constitution, the royal family was no longer eligible to take part in politics, though the king retained his substantial authority. New political parties emerged for elections. The emergence of PDPA and Islamist parties, during the last two decades of Zahir Shah's reign, is one of the most enduring phenomenon in the political history of the country. The PDPA initially emerged in the middle class of urban population and had a lasting impact on the future of the country.

Afghanistan overall witnessed a peace and tranquillity in the Musahiban's time, because both Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah neither undermined the authority of mullahs and tribal chiefs nor interfered much in the tribal rural Afghanistan.⁴⁰ It can be observed that their reforms revolved around the urban population. Therefore, a schism between urban and rural Pashtuns was emerged. The ethics of *pashtunwali* were changed on the basis of tribe's affiliation of the *nang* (rural) and *qalang* (urban) groups. A great majority of rural Pashtuns remained traditional and backward and deprived from the modern education, whereas the urban life was transformed heavily by modernization and secular education. More or less, was the condition of those lived across the Durand Line in Pakistan; FATA remained rural and

³⁸ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 460.

³⁹ Dupree, *Afghanistan*, p. 532.

⁴⁰ Haroon, *Frontier of Faith*, p. 124.

backward under their tribal conventional rules of *pashtunwali*, while the settled areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa⁴¹ became more urban with better health, trade and education facilities. As a result, the Pashtun population both in rural Afghanistan and FATA in Pakistan remained backward and underdeveloped without even basic infrastructure for health and modern education, while the traditional authority of mullah and tribal chief remained unscratched before the Soviet regimes in Afghanistan. The religious class deepened its influence across the region through establishing religious seminaries. They also resented against the democratic reforms of Zahir Shah and Daud but they waited until they gathered much strength to react against the government.

Conclusions

The present study concludes that the authority patterns of Afghan society are significantly changed since the establishment of National State of Afghanistan in 1880. The central government always remained fragile and weak, relying on the foreign financial support to establish its authority. Amir Abd al-Rahman and his successor Amir Habib Allah Khan successfully took the advantage of British financial support to establish a national state. As far as Amir Aman Allah is concerned, he lost the British financial support because of his attempt to gain autonomy in foreign affairs and because of his involvement in Pan-Islamic movement. However, the religious and tribal chiefs supported him because of his heroic and religious role in Pan-Islamic movement. In the Post-First World War scenario, Amir Aman Allah's legitimacy was challenged when he attempted to modernise Afghanistan. His reforms were considered anti-normative and anti-religious. He had to face strong hostility from both religious and tribal forces. It can be observed that the religious class asserted its authority and successfully mobilised the people against Amir Aman Allah's project of modernisation and ultimately he had to leave his rule. This move affirmed the strong authority of the religious class in political affairs in a way that the subsequent central governments had to involve them in political affairs and they emerged as religious elites in political affair; whereas, the tribal chiefs had significantly lost their authority particularly in cities and towns. The Soviet intervention again provided a space for religious elites to extend their authority across the country by calling for jihad against the foreign intervention.

⁴¹ Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is a new name of Pakistan's Province of NWFP.

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TRIBAL BELT AND THE DEFENCE OF BRITISH INDIA: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

*Salman Bangash**

Introduction

Closely interlinked with the question of the imperial defence of India was the Tribal belt or Tribal areas in the North-West Frontier region inhabited by Pashtun ethnic groups. The area was defined topographically as a strategic zone of defence, which had substantial geo-political and geo-strategic significance for the British rule in India. Tribal areas posed a complicated and multifaceted defence problem for the British Raj in India. Peace, stability and effective control in this sensitive area was vital and indispensable for the security and defence of India.

The British for their administrative expediency divided the Frontier region into settled and Tribal areas. The peculiar and weird form of administration devised by the British for the Tribal areas had no similarity anywhere in colonial India; the aim was to keep complete control in the hands of the central government so that international as well as domestic issues can be handled promptly and unswervingly. Throughout the British rule Tribal belt remained a strategic and tactical conundrum.

During the First World War, the British Government in India was faced with complicated and multifarious problems and challenges in the Tribal belt; the activities and propaganda of the Central Powers, especially the Germans and the Turks. The influence of Amir of Afghanistan and the rise of Pan-Islamism in the region were some of the grave and disturbing elements which could create catastrophic situation for the British not only in the North West Frontier but in the whole of India. This paper would critically appraise and argue British sensitivity towards the Tribal belt and how important was the role of Afghanistan in maintaining peace in the

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region during the course of the war. The paper will further explain the counter measures adopted by the British to maintain peace and stability and to thwart Central Powers activities and propaganda in the Tribal areas.

India: British Imperial prestige

British Empire at its Zenith was one of the most leading colonial and imperialist powers that the world had ever acknowledged and recognised. Her might, size and supremacy had popularized the expression “the sun never sets on the British Empire.”¹ British affluence and prosperity depended on its commerce and necessitate protecting and defending the trade routes which became intimately intertwined with the question of national security.²

In the midst of its gigantic and huge empire, India was one of its prize-worth possessions. India was the ‘brightest jewel in the imperial crown’: became the symbol of astounding, flourishing, profitable, valuable British Imperial greatness. Viceroy Mayo once said, ‘We are determined as long as sun shines in heaven to hold India.’³ This paramount prominence to India was particularized by J.W. Smith in the following words:

*India, the largest, the longest dominated and exploited of British conquests, the richest field of investment,...and profit, the base of Asiatic expansion, ...the focus of all British strategic aims, the pivot of the Empire, and the bulwark of British world domination, offers,... the most complete demonstration of the colonial system of modern imperialism.*⁴

India’s prominence was not only due to her own resources and wealth; it was the *sine qua non* in Great Britain’s establishment of diplomatic and commercial relationships with the countries in the Africa and Asia. The protection of India, its frontiers and its maritime routes therefore, became an undisputed axiom of British foreign policy. Great Britain made Herculean efforts to make sure that her European Imperialist rivals kept their hands not just off their empire in India but all the states situated in its neighborhood.

As a result, the whole region that stretched from the Central Asian plains down to the Arabian Sea in the south and the Persian Gulf in the southwest had been exposed during the 19th century, to the most delicate and complex diplomatic squabbling’s among the big powers of Europe. For the British, France under Napoleon Bonaparte and later on the conquest of

¹ *The British Empire: Where the Sun Never Sets*. Retrieved from <http://www.britishempire.co.uk>, accessed March 12, 2009.

² Mahajan, S., *British Foreign Policy, 1874-1914: The Role of India*. Routledge, London 2002, p. 2.

³ Hyam, R., *Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion*. Macmillan, New York 2002, p 35.

⁴ Smith, J.W., *The British Conquest of India*. Retrieved from <http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/ni/vol08/no02/blpi.htm>, accessed March 2, 2010.

Russia in Central Asia was perceived as a serious threat to India. The British feared that Afghanistan might become a staging post for a Russian invasion of India. Afghanistan was therefore, created a buffer state and a barrier against British adversaries with regard to India's security. As a consequence, the western and North-Western frontiers of India assumed importance for the British government in India and thus raised the strategic importance of India's North West Frontier. Sir Walter Strickland explained the imperial policy of Great Britain in these words:

*Whenever I have been in a position to see the British Empire at work and to watch it closely, I have found that the difference between that Empire and a band of hypocritical liars, thieves and murderers was more or less microscopic, and sometimes quite indistinguishable.*⁵

Tribal Belt and Its Imperial Sensitivity

The North West Frontier region termed by Toynbee as the "cross roads of civilizations",⁶ played a significant role due to its strategic location in the historical accounts of the Indian sub-continent. Home to Pashtun⁷ racial groups, which as a consequence of peculiar chronological and physical status have managed to preserve and safeguard an autonomous and independent way of life.⁸ For millennia, they confronted all those who wanted to dislocate and extricate them from their strategic position straddling the natural gateways leading from Central Asia into the Indian sub-continent.⁹ Throughout its history, the Pashtun belt witnessed a great deal of action, brutality, bravery, sacrifice, friendliness and fortitude and resilience.¹⁰

The Tribal belt incorporated and encompassed all the key passes which connect Afghanistan with British India (now Pakistan). All, even the most unreachable and inaccessible were considered by the British as potential

⁵ Reventlow, C.E.Z., *India: Its importance for Great Britain, Germany and the future of the World*. Ernst Stigefried Mittler & Son, Berlin. Count Book-Sellers Rochstrasse 68-71) Secret: A translation of a German Book prepared in the Central Intelligence Office (Simla May 1917) German-Indian Scheme, Serial No. 1514, Bundle. No. 83, p. 39. Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar, Pakistan.

⁶ Noor ul Haq, Khan, R.A. & Nuri, M.H., *Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan Northwest Tribal Belt of Pakistan*. Retrieved from <http://ipripak.org/papers/federally.shtml>, accessed March 25, 2010.

⁷ Also pronounce as 'Pakhtun', 'Pukhtun' or 'Pathan'. For the sake of this study I will use the term 'Pashtun' but will use the original spelling in direct quotation.

⁸ Ditcher, D., *The North West Frontier of Pakistan: A Study in Regional Geography*. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1967, p 1.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Swinson, A., *North West Frontier People and Events 1839-1947*. Hutchinson and Co Ltd., London 1967, p 18.

‘gate ways’ and therefore of immense strategic importance.¹¹ Once known as a *terra incognita*,¹² the Tribal belt was defined topographically a strategic zone of defense for British India.¹³

The Frontier was closely intertwined with the overall British India’s imperial policy in the region. The area was integral part of their grand strategy to counter their adversaries in the region.¹⁴ As General Fredrick Roberts once stated ‘it is essential that we should have with us the tribes who occupy the intervening country,... if they are with us, we need no anxiety; if they are against us, we shall be in serious straits,’¹⁵ and ‘they are a great factor in the defence of the North-west frontier of India.’¹⁶ According to Matthew W. Williams ‘despite the challenges of managing such a lawless frontier..., the British government in India believed that maintaining peace and stability along the border with Afghanistan was a strategic necessity.’¹⁷ For the British, Tribal belt was a strategic zone, a no man land, a buffer zone, a buffer to a buffer, a bulwark and it served as a second line of the defence to protect India.

After the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the perception of administrative frontier was replaced by “Scientific Frontier,” as part of the “ring fence” strategy of the British Empire.¹⁸ Mortimer Durand, the experienced frontier officer, put forward radical and comprehensive new frontier policy and argued that the area be turn into an active defensive barrier and the tribes who held the major itineraries and passes must be controlled and close relations should be establishment and developed with the tribes.¹⁹

After the Russian conquest of Muslim Khanates in Central Asia ‘Peace and progress on the Frontier was of little concern.... Security was the all-important objective.’²⁰ ‘Tribal territory’ J.W. Spain argued ‘was a marchland

¹¹ Leslie, H., ‘A Scientific Frontier for India: Background to the “Forward Policy of the Nineties”’, *Canadian Journal of History*, 1(1), March, 1966, pp. 46-71.

¹² Poynder, J.D., ‘A Bird’s-Eye View of the North-West Frontier’, *National Review*, 28:163 (September, 1896), pp. 103-18.

¹³ Haroon, S., *Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland*. Hurst & Company, London 2007, p 5.

¹⁴ Ahmad, S. A., ‘Pukhtun Tribes in the Great Game: Waziristan Case’, in Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat & Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah Kakakhel, (ed.) *Afghanistan and the Frontier*. Emjay Books International, Peshawar 1993), pp. 201-2.

¹⁵ *Secret Notes on the Central Asian Question and the Coast and Frontier Defences of India 1877-1893*, pp.94.-5. L/MIL/17/14/80.

¹⁶ ‘Little Wars on the Indian Frontier’, *Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine*, 157: 956, June, 1895, p. 930.

¹⁷ Williams, M.W., *The British Colonial Experience in Waziristan and its Applicability to Current Operations: A Monograph*, p 14.

¹⁸ Brobst, P.J., *The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s Independence, and the Defense of Asia*. The University of Akron Press, Ohio 2005, p 36.

¹⁹ Alder, G. J., *British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy*. Longmans, London 1963, p 158.

²⁰ Spain, J.W., *The Way of the Pathan*. Oxford University Press, Karachi 1963, p 34.

which must be dominated.²¹ General Fredrick Roberts's remarked 'nothing will strengthen our military position more than to open out the country and improve our relations with the Frontier tribes',²² and 'transforming that great natural obstacle, which has hitherto been a barrier against ourselves, into a barrier against one enemies.'²³ Henry Green, one of the robust supporters of forward policy considered frontier tribesmen potential source of defence against an attacking army. 'Such races, I consider', he said 'one of the best defence that we could have in the rear and flanks of an invading army.'²⁴ *The Edinburgh Magazine* also acknowledged the region geo-political significance and wrote 'the tribes are necessary to us as guardians of the passes; but they must be brought to hold them for us, not against us.'²⁵

Thus, the tribes were considered a great factor in the defence of the North-West frontier of India²⁶ and the area had significant role 'in the everyday history and policy of the British Empire.'²⁷ The British regarded the North-West Frontier the most vital region within British Raj in India. It was the only area in India which the British officers for years believed they could suffer a "knockout blow" either from internal insurrection or foreign invasion.²⁸

Tribal Administration

Great Britain's frontier policy had two objectives-one domestic, to secure the settled areas from tribal raids and attacks and to protect their life and property; the second-imperial, to secure the best possible position to protect India from British adversaries.²⁹ The British Government in order to strengthen its hold on the tribes took two important decisions; first in 1893 to draw a scientific border between British India and Afghanistan; signed the famous Durand Line Agreement. Which gave 'Great Britain not a single or

²¹ Ibid.

²² Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, 'The North-West Frontier of India,' *English Review*. October 1924, pp 589-99.

²³ Secret Notes on the Central Asian Question and the Coast and Frontier Defences of India 1877-1893, *Memorandum on the present position in Central Asia*. 13th June, 1887, pp 105-6.L/MIL/17/14/80.

²⁴ Colvin, A., 'The Problem Beyond the Indian Frontier,' *Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review*, 42:250, December, 1897, pp 845-68.

²⁵ 'The Future of Our N.W. Frontier', *Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine*, 162:986, December, 1897, pp 830-33.

²⁶ 'Little Wars on the Indian Frontier', *Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine*, 157: 956, June, 1895, p 930.

²⁷ Curzon, L., *Text of the 1907 Romanes Lecture on the subject of FRONTIERS*, Retrieved from <http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/links/curzon.pdf>, accessed February 3, 2010.

²⁸ Marsh, B.D., *Ramparts of Empire: India's North-West Frontier and British Imperialism, 1919-1947*. University of Texas, Texas 2009, p 2.

²⁹ Ibid., p 1.

double but a threefold Frontier: the administrative border of British India; the Durand Line, or Frontier of active protection; the Afghan border, which is the outer or advanced strategical Frontier.³⁰ And secondly, a separate province was constituted in 1901 named it, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in order to keep a close watch on the Frontier tribes to provide the area an 'efficient administration', and to secure closer and more immediate supervision of the strategic area.³¹ Regarding the creation of the new province and its sensitivity Mukulika Banerjee wrote:

*From the Anglophone perspective,... nurtured in the tradition of Kipling,...it is rather natural to conceive of the North-West Frontier Province as a front line, a periphery, a point of termination. Certainly the British tried to make it such, and the very name they assigned it, drily cartographical, suggests a geographical marginality and no man's land.*³²

Furthermore, the British in order to control this sensitive and strategic part of India introduced a policy which was based on persuasion, pressure, and armed intervention. As part of this policy, the British created agencies³³ a system of indenture and interaction; different from the administrative set up of *settled areas* for dealing with the different tribes in the Tribal areas. The weirdness and uniqueness of the tribal administration was mainly attributed to its buffer-zone position and status. In J.W. Spain words:

*The British tended to hold the Frontier apart from the rest of India as a unique and exclusive region, this peculiar and strange form of administration devised by the British for the Tribal areas has no parallel elsewhere. The British used the area as a training ground for colonial officials and a practice area for experiments in imperial government.*³⁴

The British very skillfully exercised their authority through their Political Agents, along with the inhuman judicial system known as 'the Frontier Crimes Regulation' backed by *Malaki* and *Jarga* mechanism. Apart from this, collective fines and retributions were imposed under the concept of 'collective tribal territorial responsibility.' The British put forward the

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Shah, S.W.A., *North West Frontier Province: History and Politics*. National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i- Azam University, Islamabad-Pakistan, Islamabad 2007, p xv.

³² Banerjee, M., *The Pathan Unarmed*. Oxford University Press, Karachi 2004, p 24.

³³ The first Agency which the British established in 1878 was the Khyber Agency, followed by the Kurram Agency in 1892, Malakand in 1895, and by 1896 two other agencies were created namely North and South Waziristan.

³⁴ Spain, J.W., 'Pakistan's North West Frontier,' *Middle East Journal*, 8(1), Winter, 1954, pp 27-40.

excuse that the modern and complex rules were not suited to a rude and ignorant people little familiar with written law.³⁵

Endowments and benefactions in the shape of allowances, and force, in the shape of military operations³⁶ became the apparatus of the system of recompense and punishment in the Tribal areas. Moreover, the British very cleverly made the impression that the British were not against their freedom or to obstruct their day to day life. As a matter of fact the British wanted the economical and effective administrative arrangement that would allow them to control the Tribal areas and would not require the kind of administration that was present in the rest of British India.³⁷ In this regard Mukulika Banerjee stated:

*In comparison with areas of India, the North West Frontier Province was heavily militarized, oppressively policed... the British, who in the classic manner of 'divide and rule' had sought to transform an open frontier into a closed border.*³⁸

Suffice to say during the British rule, the procedures of control and administration revealed strategic interest and administrative rationalities rather than any sincere efforts to civilize, the so-called “uncivilized” Pashtun community. The British tried to achieve the subservience of the Pashtun tribes by intimidation, deception, enticement, bribery, and divide and rule policy. The British adopted the policy of ‘might is right’ and in principle it was a ‘purely military rule’³⁹ based on authoritarian and authoritative administration. The British adopted such measures to advance and promote their imperial designs. Progress and development was not their concern, because the ultimate aim of the British overall frontier policy was the “security of India.”⁴⁰

First World War and the Defence of India

The situation on the North West Frontier of India, gave British Government of India, many anxious moments during the First World War. The British feared that the Amir of Afghanistan, Habibullah Khan, who was

³⁵ Hussain, S.I., *Some Major Pukhtoon Tribes along the Pak-Afghan Border*. Area Study Centre and Hanns Seidel Foundation, Peshawar 2000, p 5.

³⁶ A total of 51 expeditions took place between 1849 and 1914 (See Moreman, T. R., *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947*. MacMillan Press Ltd, London 1998, p xxi.

³⁷ Embree, A.T., *Pakistan's Western Borderlands: The Transformation of Political Order* Vikas, New Delhi 1977, pp xvi,-xvii.

³⁸ Banerjee, M., *The Pathan Unarmed*, p 45.

³⁹ Andrews, C. F., *The Challenge of the North-West Frontier: A Contribution to World Peace* G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1937, p 21.

⁴⁰ Khan, T.M., *The Tribal Areas of Pakistan: A Contemporary Profile*. Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore 2008, p 93.

not happy for not being consulted over the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 1907,⁴¹ and the events in Europe could give him an opportunity to declare a pre-emptive war against the British. An Anglo-Afghan war would provoke the Frontier tribes and involve them in a tribal conflagration and would force the Government to launch a full-fledge military operation in Tribal territory, with unforeseeable consequences.⁴² The situation got further complicated due to internal troubles caused by increasingly militant activities of the Indian freedom fighters in Bengal, Western India and the Punjab.⁴³ The British were further alarmed that the Indian Muslims might be aroused by pan-Islamic propaganda orchestrated by Turkey,⁴⁴ and in case of Frontier uprisings.⁴⁵ Thus, the British Government in India was faced with multifaceted challenges both at home and from abroad during the course of the First World War.

Germany had a very clear perception about the significance of India for Great Britain and its Empire.⁴⁶ They believed that the disappearance of India from the British dominion would certainly result in the breakdown and downfall of the so-called Indian “glacis” that would reduce an enormous pressure from whole of Asia. The interest of Germany and its allies in the liberation and freedom of India was quite exceptional from commercial and political perspectives.⁴⁷ Because in German’s view ‘THE INDIAN QUESTION IS AND REMAINS A QUESTION OF POWER.’⁴⁸

Having this maxim in mind the German policy makers during the First World War had spotted the potential crevice in the British imperial armour, and entered into the world of Islam with customary diligence and thoroughness. The German High Command momentarily anticipated benefiting from any “religious and political union of Islam” that might result from the Sultan of Turkey declaring *jihad* or holy war against the Allied

⁴¹ Sykes, P., *A History of Afghanistan II*. Macmillan, London 1940, pp 235-6.

⁴² Baha, L., *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*. National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad 1978, p 81.

⁴³ Hardinge, L., *My Indian Years, 1910-16*. London 1948, pp 116-7.

⁴⁴ “The promoters of the (Pan-Islamic) movement took advantage of the pro-Turkish feelings aroused by the Balkan Wars and the constant arrival of Indians at Constantinople,...to agree with them as to the possibility of creating serious movements against Great Britain in their own country. ... [And] that it was the intention of Indian Moslems to form secret societies under cover of religion for the purpose of sowing the seeds of Pan-Islamism as desired by the Turks. (From Sir F.A. Hietzel, KC.B Secretary , Political Department, India, Office, London to The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, 23rd November 1916, (Letters from D.C.I), *German-Indian Scheme*, Criminal Investigation Department 1916. Special Branch, Serial No. 1514, Bundle. 83, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar, Pakistan).

⁴⁵ Aziz, K.K., *Britain and Muslim India*. Heinemann, London 1963, pp 84-6.

⁴⁶ Reventlow, C.E.Z., *India: Its importance for Great Britain, Germany and the future of the World*, p 5.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p 23.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p 74.

Powers.⁴⁹ The German's tried to exploit the notion of Pan-Islamism, which was growing since the late nineteenth century as a dynamic force throughout the Middle East and India.

On the eve of the First World War, the Kaiser Wilhelm II wrote in one of his diplomatic report: 'Our consuls in Turkey and India ...must inflame the whole Mohammedan world to wild revolt ...for if we are to be bled to death; at least England shall lose India.'⁵⁰ Bethmann Hollweg, German Chancellor also repeated the Kaiser's view to the Foreign Office, 'One of our chief tasks is to soften up Britain gradually by harassment in India...'⁵¹ Pan-Islamic propaganda was seen by the Germans in their long-term strategy a primary and an effective military weapon to threaten the position of the Allies. On 5 August 1914, the German Chief of Staff referred to a report he had sent earlier to the ministry of foreign affairs explaining the importance of using the religion of Islam for their war time's purposes:

*It is of the utmost importance to incite rebellions in India, Egypt and the Caucasus. The agreement with Turkey will give the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the opportunity of carry out this plan in so far as possible, by arousing the fanaticism of the world of Islam.*⁵²

Germany wanted to use the notion of Islam to its cause with the help of the Ottoman Empire. Kaiser and his warmongering advisors intended to drive out the British from India and the Czarist Russia from Central Asia and the Caucasus by unleashing *Jihad* against the Triple Entente.⁵³ Kaiser Wilhelm II was assured by his counselors and advisors that India was like a powder keg of dissatisfaction and frustration and required only the torch of revolution to burst into flames.⁵⁴ They believed that if the disillusioned and disenchanted elements in India were convinced to rise against the British Raj then the British would find themselves in a very precarious situation.⁵⁵ In this regard Count Ernst Zu Reventlow argued:

The outbreak of serious unrest in India, or even an admission that such exists and that an insurrection which cannot be suppressed, is being hatched in India would shake the prestige of

⁴⁹ Gregorian, V., *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 1969, p 220.

⁵⁰ Manjapra, K.K., 'The Illusions of Encounter: Muslim 'Minds' and Hindu Revolutionaries in First World War Germany and after', *Journal of Global History*, 1(3), November 2006, pp 363-382.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Atabaki, T., *Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the great powers*. I.B. Tauris, New York 2006, p 31.

⁵³ Hopkirk, P., *On Secret Service East of Constantinople*. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994, p 2.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p 1.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p 3.

*Great Britain to its foundations, both in Asia and in the whole world. The British know well the meaning of the word prestige and they also know that the recognition of their power in Asia, or of at least three-quarters of it, depends on this very prestige.*⁵⁶

Three months after the commencement of the war, Turkish Empire joined the war against the Allied powers. The German's with the co-operation and collaboration of the Sultan of Turkey planned various groups of political missionaries, consisted of Turkish, Germans and Indian members, who would visit Persia [Iran], Afghanistan and the Arab world stirring up anti-British feelings and propaganda for holy war.⁵⁷ Enver Pasha, Turkey's War Minister highlighted this point in these words:

*we call the whole world of Islam to rise up in arms.... We will send our most resourceful men to strike the Allies' interests wherever it will be. In this way we will cause, India, Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Persia, and all Africa to rise up against the Allies enemy. The world of Islam will soon come under the command of the Caliph.*⁵⁸

After the Turkish entering the war the conflict thus assumed a new complexity as far as the emotions of the Muslims were concerned. The Turkish Empire was looked upon by many Muslim as an emblem of unity, strength and status and their participation in the war aroused Pan-Islamic and pro-Turkish sentiments not only among the Indian Muslims but particularly amongst Pashtun community of Tribal belt of the North-West Frontier Province. Roos-Keppel, The Chief Commissioner of the Province underlined his apprehensions by saying that "the contingency had to be faced that war with Turkey might unfavourably affect the situation, might chill the warmth of the popular good-will, and create a dangerous sympathy with future trans-frontier attacks launched against us in the name of religion."⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Reventlow, *India: Its importance for Great Britain, Germany and the future of the World*, p 64.

⁵⁷ Manjapra, The illusions of encounter: Muslim 'minds' and Hindu revolutionaries in First World War Germany and after, *Journal of Global History*. The Turkish press for the sake of propaganda published a picture of the Kaiser in which the latter wore Arab dress and was dubbed "Haji Wilhelm." (Khan, A., *Mawlana Ubayd Allah Sindhi's Mission to Afghanistan and Soviet Russia*. Area Study Centre (Russia & Central Asia) & Hanns Seidal Foundation, Islamabad 1998, p 41.

⁵⁸ Atabaki, *Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the great powers*, p 29.

⁵⁹ The Chief Commissioner, Roos Keppel, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated 15th June 1915, cited by Abdul Rauf in 'Pan -Islamism and The North West Frontier Province of British India (1897-1918)', *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 12 (2007), pp. 21-42.

Afghanistan: The Hub of International Intrigues

The modern history of Afghanistan is the 'history of conflict--of invasions, battles and sieges, of vendettas, assassinations and massacres, of tribal feuding, dynastic strife and civil war'.⁶⁰ Afghanistan, due to its strategic position was dragged into the sphere of international politics. For the British, Afghanistan during the Great Game and early 20th century was like a *cordon sanitaire*; a bulwark and a first line of defence against the foreign encroachments towards the North-West Frontier of India. Throughout that period Russia and Great Britain with their diplomatic squabbling's tried to influence Afghanistan. British interest in Afghanistan was founded on the compulsion and obligation to maintain and consolidate her imperial position and hold in India. In order to fulfil its objectives Afghanistan was twice invaded during the 19th century, its borders were redefined; the country was made a buffer state as part of British 'ring fence strategy' to protect its interest in the region. Lord Curzon gave a very critical analysis of the Anglo-Afghan relation. He argued:

*For fifty years there has not been an Afghan Amir whom we have not alternately fought against and caressed, now repudiating and now recognising his sovereignty, now appealing to his subjects as their saviours, now slaughtering them as our foes...Each one of these men has known the British both as enemies and as patrons, and has commonly only won the patronage by the demonstration of his power to command it. Small wonder that we have never been trusted by the Afghan rulers, or liked by the Afghan people!...Afghanistan has long been the Achilles' heel of Great Britain in the East. Impregnable elsewhere, she has shown herself uniformly vulnerable here.*⁶¹

During the First World War, the neutrality of Afghanistan was once more of immense importance for the defence and protection of British Raj in India. Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy of India realizing the gravity of situation quickly informed Amir Habibullah, about the outbreak of the war, asked him to preserve neutrality during the war and requested him to take extraordinary steps to maintain order and calm on the Indo-Afghan border. To the much relief of the Viceroy, the Amir assured him of his neutrality, and repeated his promise in November 1914 when Ottoman Empire entered the conflict.⁶²

Amir Habibullah throughout the war remained true to his pledge, although it was not an easy job. Nasrullah Khan, his younger brother, who led a pro-Turkish and anti-British bloc at Kabul, supported by religious and

⁶⁰ Ewans, M., *Afghanistan, A Short History of Its People and Politics*. HarperCollins, New York 2002, p 12.

⁶¹ Curzon, G.N., *Russia in Central Asia*. Routledge, London 2008, p 356.

⁶² Baha, N.W.F.P. *Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p. 82.

extremist elements made no secret of their disapproval to the neutral policy of the Amir. They applied great pressure on him to declare a war against the British in favour of Turkey.⁶³ The situation became further complicated and more difficult for the Amir when a Turco-German mission, headed by Captain Oskar von Niedermayer and Kazim Bey,⁶⁴ arrived at Kabul in August 1915 along with the letters from the Sultan⁶⁵ and Kaiser for him.⁶⁶ In addition to this, the Indian freedom fighter (called seditionists by the British) and the anti-British elements at Kabul added more pressure on him. There were rumors of revolt against him, and even of his murder.⁶⁷

The Turco-German mission tried through religious endeavours, moral pressure, promises of military and financial assistance, to persuade the Amir to enter the war and back an Indian uprising.⁶⁸ The Germans and Turks hoped that if Habibullah was convinced, he could cause a major revolt in the Pashtun belt on the Indian border.⁶⁹ William Barton in this context, remarks, "Had the Amir preached a holy war against the infidel there can be little doubt that the whole borderland would have answered the call".⁷⁰ Whereas Mohammad Ali Qasuri, who himself was a participant viewed that if Amir would declare war, the history of not only India but of the whole Islamic World 'would have been written differently'.⁷¹

But Habibullah meticulously handled the situation: he received the Turco-German mission with great respect but kept it guessing about his intents and plan; He told the delegation politely "I am a lone man and fearsome of the British and the Russian allies between the upper and the nether millstone. ... I wait the Turkish armies on their way to India, and I shall be ready to lead the hosts of Islam by their side. *Ya Ali!*"⁷²

He listened to the arguments and the advice of the war-party in his court but never acted on it. He told them "it would be the height of folly for the

⁶³ L.W. Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 90.

⁶⁴ The mission consisted of eighty men, along with few leading Indian revolutionaries, including Mohendra Pratap, Barkatullah and Obaid ullah Sindhi.

⁶⁵ The Sultan of Turkey, asked the Amir to proclaim a crusade against the imperialists and not to refrain from announcing a Holy War (Jihad) against Britain and instigating the frontier tribes against the British in India (see Zahid Anwar, 'Indian Freedom Fighters in Central Asia (1914-1939)', J.R.S.P., Vol. 45, No. 2, 2008), pp. 147-58.

⁶⁶ Atabaki, *Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great Powers*, p 31.

⁶⁷ Baha, *N.W.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p. 82. See also Louis Dupree *Afghanistan*: Princeton University Press, Princeton 1968, pp 434-5.

⁶⁸ Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, p 112.

⁶⁹ Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*, p 221.

⁷⁰ Barton, W., *India's North-West Frontier*. John Murray, London 1939, p 75.

⁷¹ Rauf, 'Pan-Islamism and The North West Frontier Province of British India (1897-1918)'

⁷² MacMunn, G., *Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah*. Sang-e- Meel Publications, Lahore 2002, p 256.

Afghans to throw in their lot with Turkey, when Russia and Britain were in alliance, and might combine to crush Afghanistan.”⁷³

Furthermore, Habibullah managed to a great extent to contain his subjects from transgressions in British territory, criticized and scolded the most powerful and influential Afghan mullahs for encouraging raids against the British, and even discouraged the tribes on the other side of the Durand Line from hostility towards the British.⁷⁴

The Amir's role was of great political significance, for it facilitated in controlling the situation on the frontier. The Home Government and the Viceroy Hardinge were confident in Amir's good faith, and as a result in September 1915, the Government of India increased his subsidy by two lakhs of rupees and George V sent the Amir a letter of thanks.⁷⁵ Appreciating the diplomatic skills of Amir Habibullah, Vartan Gregorian writes:

*The Amir's policy of benevolent neutrality toward the British was motivated primarily by political and economic considerations. Entry into the war would have exposed Afghanistan to a combined Anglo-Russia attack. Not only was the country too weak to withstand such an attack militarily, it was too weak economically and, moreover, depended largely on trade conducted through India and Russia.*⁷⁶

There were other reasons as well. Pan-Islamism had not yet demonstrated to be a global Islamic political movement which could galvanize and stimulate the Muslim world. Instead, the Arabs which had revolted against the Ottoman Empire were a great psychological blow and the followers of Shia Islam also did not recognise the Ottoman Caliph, like the rest of the Sunni Islam.

Habibullah renewed his assurances to Great Britain of his continued friendship, and in January 1916, again declared his neutrality in uncompromising terms at a public durbar.⁷⁷ He wrote to King George V, ‘I can assure you that we will remain neutral and keep our pledge to the last’⁷⁸ and at the same time managed to conclude a tentative treaty with German, making Afghan participation in the war contingent upon the arrival of a

⁷³ Barton, *India's North-West Frontier*, p 141.

⁷⁴ The British government in India watched the activities of the mission with great concern and considered it a grave and serious threat - so much so that they tried to intercept the travellers in Persia, en route from Istanbul to Kabul and consequently deployed their own intelligence and diplomatic strategies to ensure that Afghanistan would retain its neutral position.

⁷⁵ Baha, *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p 83.

⁷⁶ Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*, p 222.

⁷⁷ Ewans, M., *Afghanistan: A New History*. Curzon Press, London 2001, p 84.

⁷⁸ Anwar, R., *The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A first Hand Account* (London: Vergo, 1988), p. 18.

large military force, huge supplies of armaments, and sizable amount of gold.⁷⁹

In the same year British and Russian military successes in southern Persia and eastern Turkey respectively, no doubt reduced whatsoever interest the Amir may have had for the cause of the Central Powers. The fall of Kut al Amara in February in 1917 and the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Persia in the same year ended all Turko-German hope of success in Persia and Afghanistan.⁸⁰

After months of frustrating negotiations it became clear that despite promises of money, military hardware and territorial gains, Habibullah was not prepared to put at risk his profitable relationship with British.⁸¹ To forestall the complete failure of the mission there was even talk of staging a palace coup.⁸² However, most of the members of the Niedermayer mission left Kabul on 22 May, 1916 characterizing the Amir of Afghanistan with such words as “hare-brained”, “fanciful”, and preposterous.”⁸³ The Mission had failed in its immediate object,⁸⁴ although succeeded to establish contact with a number of revolutionaries within India and with the border tribes.⁸⁵ Elaborating the significance of the German mission to Afghanistan Peter Hopkirk wrote:

*Had they succeeded in unleashing the full fury of the Amir's forces against the British in India, they might well have changed the course of the war. Indeed, their names, like that of Lawrence, might have been remembered to this day. As it was, they had suffered great hardship and faced innumerable perils, only to see it all collapse in failure.*⁸⁶

British Secretary of State for war Lord Kitchener estimated that if the Mission would have succeeded in convincing the Amir to attack India, Great Britain would have to divert more than 135,000 men from other parts of war to defend successfully the sub-continent.⁸⁷ In J.W. Adamec opinion:

⁷⁹ Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan II*, pp. 257-58. According to Adamec the treaty provided for assistance in the amount of 20 million pounds in gold as well as 50, 000 artillery pieces, hundred thousand rifles and an enormous amount of ammunition. (See L. W. Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*. University of California Press, 1967, p. 179).

⁸⁰ Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan II*, p 256.

⁸¹ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, p 84.

⁸² Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan II*, p 95.

⁸³ Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918*, p 112.

⁸⁴ Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*, p 223.

⁸⁵ Jalalzai, M.K., *The Foreign Policy of Afghanistan*. Sang-e- Meel Publications, Lahore 2003, p 65.

⁸⁶ Stewart, J., *The Kaiser's Mission to Kabul: A Secret Expedition to Afghanistan in World War I*. I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2014, pp xv-xvi.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. x.

*The German mission to Afghanistan was successful in so far as it accomplished some of its objectives: it disturbed Russia and Britain greatly with its activities, and it carried hostile propaganda into an area hitherto, the exclusive concern of those two European powers. The expedition comes with more than a message and it nearly succeeded in involving Afghanistan in the war.*⁸⁸

Habibullah remained resolute to his policy of neutrality and the outcome of the war justified his stance. There was a general belief among a good number of people in Afghanistan that he had let down her Islamic values and had failed to grab the opportunity to become fully independent that was possible especially after the Russian Revolution of 1917.⁸⁹ 'But intrigue or no intrigue' argued George MacMunn, 'Habibullah kept the peace, and the world War came to an end without Afghanistan being numbered among the combatants.'⁹⁰

Turkish Activities in the Tribal Belt

Although the Turco-German Mission met with failure in Kabul, it succeeded in establishing contact with a number of revolutionaries within India and with the border tribes.⁹¹ In June 1916 two delegates were sent; one was led by Turkish colonel Khired Bey, and the other was Mohammad Abid.⁹² The mission managed to establish a centre for the anti-British activities in Tirah (an area in the Khyber Agency), in the Tribal belt. A British agent in Kabul also reported that some of the members of the Mission had been sent to visit Mohmand and Wazir areas in the Tribal belt.⁹³ Turkish agents were also busy in Bajaur and the Mahsud country.⁹⁴ Roos-Keppel, the Chief Commissioner of North-West Frontier Province reported in July 1916, that "besides the parties sent to Terah and Bajaur, other parties [of Turks] with escorts of Afridi deserters have gone to the Mahsud border and to the neighbor-hood of Chaman."⁹⁵

⁸⁸ Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*, p. 96 The British Government was also apprehensive about the non-European members of the mission. The Muslim members could appeal to Afghans on the basis of Islamic solidarity. They also spoke the local languages and could have a more intimate contact with the people and be much more effective with the frontier tribes. Ibid., p 96.

⁸⁹ Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, p 84.

⁹⁰ MacMunn, *Afghanistan from Darius To Amanullah*, p 257.

⁹¹ Jalalzai, M.K., *The Foreign Policy of Afghanistan*. Sang-e- Meel Publications, Lahore 2003, p 65.

⁹² An Arab, formerly employed by the Turks as a drill instructor in Kabul.

⁹³ Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*, p 97.

⁹⁴ Baha, NW.F.P. *Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p 94.

⁹⁵ Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*, p 98.

Before the arrival of the Turkish emissaries, one of their agents, Mir Mast, a Kamber Khel Afridi had already been intriguing and exciting the Afridis.⁹⁶ On their arrival the Turkish emissaries delivered anti-British speeches and showed a flag, to be sent by the Turkish Sultan⁹⁷ and asked the Afridis for their support against the British. They also promised to supply arms, ammunition and money. Their stay and propaganda in Tirah had some success, many deserters or dismissed Pashtun soldiers, mainly, pro-Afghan Afridis from the British Imperial Indian army joined ranks and later formed what they called “Turkish army” and sometimes the “Amir's army” and the number of Afridi recruits enlisted in that army had reached 400 by July 1916.⁹⁸

Roos-Keppel through his local agents kept close surveillance of the Turkish activities. He acknowledged that Turkish agents had created a split in the Afridi tribe: one pro-British and the other pro-Turkish. The Chief Commissioner initially did not take any action against them and their Afridi supporters for what he called it “a very delicate equilibrium” in the tribe, and more importantly, he was against creating any strain relations between Afghanistan and the British and therefore, thought it better to “leave the Turks alone”.⁹⁹

But things changed when in September 1916 under pressure from the British officers in the Khyber, the pro-British Afridis told the Turks that unless and until they would not see the united armies of Germany, Afghanistan, and Turkey with their own eyes on the Indian frontiers they [Afridis] would neither rise or create any problem to the British in the Tribal areas.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, they informed the Turks that they should not expect any help from the Afridis unless the Amir of Afghanistan would not declare *Jihad* and they also demanded huge amount of money and arms.¹⁰¹ The British also won some mullahs at their side which helped them to check anti-British activities in the area.¹⁰² By September 1916 the pro-British faction of the Afridis managed to drive out the Turkish emissaries from Tirah to Rajgal near the Afghan border where they remained for the next six months before ousting them completely from the area with the help of tribal *lashkar* (a tribal force) under the command of Malik Zaman Khan, an influential pro-

⁹⁶ Mir Mast served in the British 58th Rifles Regiment, from which had deserted in France and then accompanied the Turco-German mission to Kabul.

⁹⁷ Shah, S.W.A., *German Activities in NWFP (1914-45)*. Retrieved from http://www.khyber.org/history/a/german_activities_in_nwfp_1914.shtml, accessed June 12, 2014.

⁹⁸ Baha, *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p 94

⁹⁹ Baha, L., ‘The North-West frontier in the first World War,’ *Asian Affairs*, 1(1), 1970, pp 29-37.

¹⁰⁰ Shah, *German Activities in NWFP (1914-45)*.

¹⁰¹ Baha, ‘The North-West frontier in the first World War’.

¹⁰² Shah, *German Activities in NWFP (1914-45)*.

British Afridi elder.¹⁰³ In June 1917, the Turks were reported to have finally left the tribal territory and crossed over to Afghanistan. Turkish conspiracies and intrigues continued also in Mohmand and Bajaur, but as a whole the Turks failed in their mission to stir a tribal rising against the British during the war period. The British rewarded the tribes by sanctioning a bonus of one year's allowances.¹⁰⁴

Activities of Various Groups in the Tribal Belt

To maintain peace with the tribes in the Tribal belt became more difficult and problematic during the war by the presence of different groups both from India and from abroad. The area provided both a sanctuary and a base of operations for these groups. The groups included the Mujahidin (holy warriors), called by the British the "Hindustani Fanatics",¹⁰⁵ the Indian revolutionaries termed as the "seditionists",¹⁰⁶ Haji Sahib of Turangzai, a prominent religious leader and the Turkish agents. With the commencement of the war the Hindustani Fanatics, realizing the British multifaceted problem in the war stepped up their activities by making Sittana in Buner and Chamarkand in Bajour as their bases which became the centre of unrest in the tribal territory. The Hindustani Fanatics organized many attacks from tribal territory against British positions. In April 1915 they attacked the village of Rustam on the Peshawar border. The Government responded by blockading their areas. They were involved in another attack when they coordinated with Swatis in August attacking the British in Landakai Spur. The Hindustani Fanatics under the leadership of Mawlana Bashir were very active in Tirah and set up a colony at Sarkash, a Kuki Khel village in Tirah. During the year 1916 they were also involved in the rising in the Tribal areas of Mohmand.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Baha, 'The North-West frontier in the first World War'.

¹⁰⁴ The Border Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province for the year 1917-18, p.3, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar, Pakistan.

¹⁰⁵ Founded by Syed Ahmed Shah of Bareilly early in the nineteenth century.

¹⁰⁶ They were small but well-organised group of Hindus Sikhs and Muslims, whose aim was to overthrow the British Government in India by violent means. The outbreak of war in Europe offered a great opportunity to members of the Indian Revolutionary Party to further their designs by enlisting the aid of Germany. The composition of Indian Revolutionary Party included the Berlin Group, Paris group, Egyptian Party, Indians in England, International Anarchists in Switzerland, supporters in America, and Dutch East Indian and the Far East Party. They took their models from Europe and looked for support there as well as in India. They saw in the war an opportunity to stir up trouble by appealing to the "ignorance and fanaticism" of the frontier tribes.

(German-Indian Scheme: Secret: Extract from the Weekly Report of the Director, Criminal Intelligence, Dated 11th April 1916. Criminal Investigation Department 1916.No. 83. Letters from D.C.I. Special Branch Serial No. 1514, Bundle No. 83, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar, Pakistan).

¹⁰⁷ Baha, L., 'The Activities of the Mujahidin 1900-1936,' *Islamic Studies*, 18(2), Summer 1979, pp 97-168.

In August 1916, a well-known conspiracy plan the ‘Silk Letter Case’ came to light. The conspirators aimed at “overthrowing British rule by an attack on the North West Frontier supplemented by a Muslim rising in India”. It was found that the Hindustani Fanatics were “an integral part of the whole conspiracy”. Consequently, the British took strong measures for the interception of men and money to the movement.¹⁰⁸ The Hindustani Fanatics were supported by the freedom fighters from the Far East, Panjab, Kabul, by German agents and other anti-British elements. Roos-Keppel, therefore, emphasized that the government efforts “to break up the organization in India... should not be relaxed”.¹⁰⁹ The British considered Chamarkand as a dangerous place of ‘subversive forces of revolution’, and of ‘fanaticism’ of ‘anarchy’ on the North-West Frontier and the government must go for its “total extinction.”¹¹⁰

The British used both force and reconciliation policy. The British were involved in secret talks with the leader of the movement Niamatullah Khan to convince him about their futile efforts. After four months of negotiations, an understanding was reached. The treaty between Amir Niamatullah, and the Frontier authorities was signed on 5th December 1917, the Government sanctioned Niamatullah certain allowances on condition that he kept his men away from anti-British elements in the tribal territory. The subsequent agreement was a sign of relief for the British authority and it helped them to concentrate against other anti-British elements.¹¹¹

For the British Government the most important individual who crossed over to Tribal areas at the end of April 1915 was Fadl-i Wahid, popularly known as the Haji Sahib of Turangzai. His coming to the Tribal areas came as a “great surprise” to Roos-Keppel. According to Roos-Keppel, he was persuaded by Saifur Rahman, a terminated school master from Delhi, to go to the Tribal areas and raise the standard of revolt and *Jihad*.¹¹² Roos-Keppel tried to persuade him through his friends and many leading Khans of the Peshawar district but in vain. By the end of July 1915, it was reported that the Haji Sahib was “in active communication with most of the Mullah’s on the Northern Frontier”.¹¹³ Travelling to Buner to the famous shrine of Pir Baba, Haji Sahib was received with ‘acclamation’ by the people of Buner, Swat. The Hindustani Fanatics also welcomed him. Haji Turangzai was perhaps the most respected and reliable person in the tribal territory, he was

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ See Altaf Qadir, ‘Anti-Colonial Movement: The Struggle of the Haji Sahib Turangzai to do away with the authority of the British Raj,’ *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Karachi, April-June, 2008, LVI(2), pp 111-123.

¹¹² Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 25 August 1915 cited by Lal Baha in ‘The Activities of the Mujahidin 1900-1936’.

¹¹³ Baha, L., *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*. p 98.

quite influence in the Peshawar district and in tribal border where he enjoyed a status of purity and selfless compassion.

Haji Turangzai visited Mohmands, Bajauris and Swatis, to preach holy war. In June 1915 with a lashkar of 4,000 strong he attacked British territory on the north-eastern border of Peshawar. In a secret telegraph, it was noted that if "Haji [Turangzai] has any success however, small a strong religious movement will be set on foot and the flame may spread to other tribes..."¹¹⁴ The Babra Mulla of Bajaur led a 10,000 strong tribal *lashkar* against Shabqadar in September, 1915, and 3,000 in October, 1915.¹¹⁵

In another encounter at Rustam border, on 17 August, 1915, the British engaged several thousand tribesmen.¹¹⁶ The British tried to limit his activities so that he may not succeed to inflame the whole Tribal belt. Haji Sahib roamed around Swat, Bajaur and finally settled in the Mohmand country. His religio-spiritual status made him to raise the standard of revolt against the British in Mohmand many times. British troops were hurried again and again to Shabqadar, at the main approach to Mohmand territory to encounter Haji Sahib and his followers.¹¹⁷ The British on 15 November 1916 used airpower for the first time against the Mohmand tribes.¹¹⁸ The Government made peace with the Mohmands because of troubles with the Mahsud tribes and the blockade against the Mohmand was lifted in July 1917.

The condition on the border greatly improved in 1917 as compared to the previous two years. At the end of the 1917 the lower Mohmand tribes were the only source of trouble. Effective steps taken by the British 'resulted in the departure of the Haji Sahib of Turangzai from Buner.'¹¹⁹ 'The wild rumpurs' writes Major J. A. Brett 'which seemed likely to cause a general rising along the border ... have been largely discredited and most of tribes seem at the moment of writing to have a genuine desire to live at peace.'¹²⁰ The confidential Political Border Administration Report-1916-17 mentioned:

All mullahs have lost credit and the treatment accorded to the Haji of Turangzai during the summer of 1916 is a fair indication of

¹¹⁴ From H. Wheeler Secretary to the Government of India to J.E. Donald, Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor General. Deputy, Secret Telegraph, dated 15th August 1915, Disturbances on the Frontier 1914-15, Commissioner Office Peshawar, Serial No. 217, Bundle No. 12, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar, Pakistan.

¹¹⁵ Khan, M.F., 'The Life and Times of Haji Sahib of Turanzai,' *Islamic Studies*, 16(1), Spring 1977, pp 329-341.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Baha, L., *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p 99.

¹¹⁹ From Major J.A. Brett, I.A., Assistant Commissioner, Mardan to Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar. No. 805, dated 6th April 1917. Confidential: political Border Administration Report -1916-17, Serial No. 149, Bundle No. 9. p. 2, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar, Pakistan.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p 20.

*their universal unpopularity in the tribe. This marked loss of credit by the mullahs is attributable to (1) The trouble and loss caused to the tribe by their intrigue in 1915 (2) The Amir's open condemnation of their propaganda and (3) the disappointment of general tribal expectations which were raised at the commencement of the war in Europe in regard to the attentions of the Turks to invade India from the North, the reputed conversion of the Germans to Islam etc. The wildest rumours were current at the commencement of the war, but the tribes are now better informed and the prognostications of the Mullahs have been falsified by our success in Egypt, Mesopotamia etc.*¹²¹

Haji Turangzai was not only supported by the Hindustani Fanatics against the British but he also established contact with the anti-British party at Kabul and set up a press from which he published jihad pamphlets.¹²² Haji Sahib did create problems for the British during the war period but failed to form a united stance against the British.¹²³

British Counter Measures

When the war started British Government in India maintained a 'watchful policy' towards the tribes.¹²⁴ At the beginning of the war the aim was to watch the Mohmands and the Mahsuds, both of whom were restless. Fortunately, for the British the tribes of Swat and the Khyber Agency, Waziris of Tochi; Bhattanis of Jandola, offered their services and support to the British. The North Waziristan Militia and the Khyber Rifles also offered contingents for active service.¹²⁵

As the war proceeded, the strategic spectrum of the area had become more wearisome as the vagaries of a World War played itself out on the Frontier, demonstrating the intricacy of the situation that confronted the

¹²¹ Confidential: political Border Administration Report -1916-17. Deputy Commissioner Peshawar, Serial No. 149. Bundle, No. 9.p. 25, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar, Pakistan.

¹²² Baha, L., *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p 99.

¹²³ Another contributor to the uneasiness in the Pashtun hills was a group of Muslim students from India, principally from the Deoband College in the United Provinces. These men maintain close connections with the Indian independence movement that had been developing in the United States. Though they had been observed and infiltrated by the efficient British secret police in 1915, some managed to escape across the border to take refuge in Kabul or among the Mujahidin, where they continued their intrigues. (See Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway to Conquest*, p.180).

¹²⁴ Baha, L., *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p. 83. In August 1914 three divisions of infantry and a cavalry brigade were maintained on the frontier on a 'mobilised footing', with three other frontier brigades at Kohat, Bannu and Derajat. Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

British in the Frontier.¹²⁶ The uneasy calm on the frontier was threatened in November 1914 by Turkey's entry into the war and put the British administration in dilemma. In a telegram sent by Viceroy to the Secretary of State informing him that war with Turkey had been 'greatly affecting the trans-frontier Pathans.'¹²⁷

The British War with Turkey provided an opportunity to the mullahs in the Tribal areas encouraged and supported by the mullahs of southern Afghanistan to motivate the tribesmen to *jihad*.¹²⁸ The stories of Turkish victories and a cohesive move by Turkey and Afghanistan to invade British India were also common in the region.¹²⁹

The war with Turkey created another problem most notably desertion of tribesmen from military service.¹³⁰ The propaganda that Afghanistan and Turkey would soon join against the British Empire had its effect on tribal recruits, especially the Afridis. In such an event, 'the families of the Afridis serving in the British Army would be regarded as having aided the 'infidel'.¹³¹ As a consequence, desertions increased and by mid-1915, it has reached to nearly 10 percent among the Afridis.¹³² The situation became so serious that in November 1915 all recruitment of trans-border Pashtuns was stopped and the total number of the Pashtun soldiers in British imperial Indian Army was less than 1,800 by the end of 1918.¹³³ To counter this situation the Government of India, was forced to resort both politically and militarily. The attitude of the Afridis, "the keystone of the frontier arch", was of great significance. Roos-Keppel, in highlighting this point stated:

*In the Muhammadan crisis, which there is reason to believe is approaching rapidly, their [Afridi] friendship will be of incalculable value. So long as we hold Afridis, who can form a fireproof curtain between northern and southern Islam on this frontier, no Jihad or rising can be general.*¹³⁴

¹²⁶ Christian Tripodi, *Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947*. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey 2011, p 115

¹²⁷ Baha, 'The North-West frontier in the first World War'

¹²⁸ Indian Army units were despatched to Mesopotamia [Iraq] and other theatres of war in the Middle East. As a result, for several weeks in 1915 the number of troops for the maintenance of internal security in India fell dangerously below the safety level, the total British garrison in India being less than 15,000 men. The mutiny of the 130th Baluch Regiment and the suspected disaffection of other Indian troops added to the Government's worries.

¹²⁹ Baha, L., 'The Trans-Frontier Pathan Soldiers and The First World War,' *Islamic Studies*, 25(4), Winter 1986, pp 387-93.

¹³⁰ Omessi, D., *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940*. MacMillan Press, London 1994, p 20.

¹³¹ Tripodi, *Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947*, p 115.

¹³² Omessi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940*, p 20.

¹³³ Baha, 'The Trans-Frontier Pathan Soldiers and The First World War'.

¹³⁴ Roos-Keppel to Secretary Government of India, cited in Lal Baha, 'The Trans-Frontier Pathan Soldiers and The First World War'.

He further said that the Orakzais and Mohmands tribes were keenly watching the Afridi's response. He therefore, requested the Government to increase the allowances of Afridis for their loyalty and good conduct. The Home Government accepted and doubled the allowances, agreeing that the "wisdom of this concession at the present time can hardly be disputed."¹³⁵ On 13 February 1915 in the Victoria Memorial Hall, Peshawar, Roos-Keppel announced the grant of increased allowances in a gathering of 3000 tribal elders and he hoped that "the maliks, the elders and the tribe as a whole will be with us and that nothing but a general upheaval of the Islamic World, including Afghanistan, will shake the Afridis".¹³⁶ According to Christian Tripodi:

*Afridi and Turks, aside Roos-Keppel's main priorities as the war progressed centred on effective administration within tribal agencies, the amelioration of wider tribal antipathy, and the cultivation of effective intelligence with regard to Afghanistan particularly the burgeoning German influence in the country.*¹³⁷

At the same time, military measures were taken purely on defensive line. This policy, as Roos-Keppel elaborated was 'to keep on as good terms as possible with the tribes who are behaving well, freely to use force in crushing any incipient outbreak'.¹³⁸ In November 1915 Roos-Keppel informed Hardinge:

*It is a merciful dispensation of Providence that these tribes can never combine, short as we are of troops at present, we should be hard put to it were several of the bigger tribes to rise simultaneously- but they always give us time to settle one lot before taking on the next.*¹³⁹

Meanwhile, the diplomatic activities in Kabul by anti-British elements greatly perturbed the Commissioner of North-West Frontier Province. In January, 1916, seemingly fictitious letter supposedly signed up by the Amir Habiullah, Nasrullah, and other top brass was addressed to the qazis, mullahs and tribal elders of the Tirah was circulated on the frontier. It read:

We are much pleased with you and you should prepare yourself for holy war which will, if God pleases, take place in summer next. You should completely prepare yourself we will supply you with rifles, as many as you required. You should make each and every

¹³⁵ Viceroy to Secretary of State cited in Lal Baha, 'The North-West frontier in the first World War,'.

¹³⁶ Baha, L., *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p 85.

¹³⁷ Tripodi, *Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947*, p 116.

¹³⁸ Baha, L., *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p 86.

¹³⁹ Baha, L., 'The North-West frontier in the first World War'.

*man firm to take up this enterprise and fortify each and every place.*¹⁴⁰

Stories of Kaiser's plans to invade Persia, Afghanistan and Egypt got much attention in the Tribal areas. The Germans and the Turks also made an attempt to win over the Pashtuns, Sikh, and the Baluchi soldiers of the Indian army, who were active in Mesopotamia [Iraq], Palestine, Egypt, East Africa, Burma, Singapore and France. They tried to influence the Pashtuns and the Baluchis through Pan-Islamism and the Sikhs through the Ghadr [War] party, but they had little success.¹⁴¹

Apart from this, a revolutionary Government which was formed in exile at Kabul calling itself the 'Provisional Government of India' believed that once the people of the Tribal areas rose against the British imperialist, they hoped it would have its aftershock in the whole country.¹⁴² Roos-Keppel was apprehensive that Amir of Afghanistan was showing signs of wavering due to pressure from Nasrullah and his men as regard to his neutral policy. Hardinge, reported Chief Commissioner's apprehension to Chamberlain in January 1916, and considered it too suspicious and pessimistic. Sir A.H. Grant explained Nasrullah stance and policy in the following words:

*...has always aimed at preventing, so far as possible, establishment of really good relations between us and our trans-border tribes. A belt of disturbed territory is a safeguard to Afghanistan, so Nasrullah think's...all he wants at present is to detach the Afridis from their allegiance to us incase circumstances later make war between Afghanistan and India in inevitable. I do not believe that the Amir is the definite party to this business, though he probably gives Nasrullah a free hand to intrigue as he think's fit up to a certain point.*¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*, p 97.

¹⁴¹ Sir George Macmunn, *The Martial Races of India*. Gosha-e-Adab: Sole distributors, Nisa Traders, Quetta 1977, p 245. Roos-Keppel was informed that the German tried to preach 'sedition to Indian prisoners in Germany and, if possible, to Indian troops in France.' The report further said that 'an interesting photograph taken from one of the German illustrated papers showing a visit paid by oriental visitors to the Indian soldiers' camp at Doberitz. Among these visitors can be recognized Chempakaraman Pillai, Sheikh Shawish, and two Indian Muhammadans, Abdur Rahman Sindi, and Abdul Sattar (see Secret: Foreign and Political Department Simla, 1 October 1915. To lieutenant-Colonel Sir George Roos-Keppel, KCSI, KCIE Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the NWFP, German- Indian Schemes in Europe, German Indian Scheme: Secret : List of persons connected with the German-Indian Scheme. (Letters from the D.C.I.)Period 1915 Serial No.1513, Bundle No. 83.)

¹⁴² Hopkirk, *On Secret Service East of Constantinople*, p. 186. The self-proclaimed Provisional Government nominated Raja Mahendra Pratap as its President, Barkatullah as Prime Minister and Obaidullah Sindhi as the Minister of Home and Foreign Affairs.

¹⁴³ Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*, p 98.

Nonetheless, in February 1916 the strain situation relaxed when the long-awaited reply of the Amir to the King's and the Viceroy's letters reached Delhi. Meanwhile, the Allies' prestige in Afghanistan was restored due to the Russian successes in Persia and the Caucasus and this success proportionally reinforced Habibullah's position. In the year 1916 the arrival of four garrison battalions from England to India improved the military position of British Government in India. On 17 February 1916 Roos-Keppel in a show of force organized at Peshawar, an aircraft flight demonstration which was seen by 25,000 tribesmen with many Afridi maliks and chiefs among them, together with a good number of Afghans, with tremendous effect on them.¹⁴⁴

In the first half of 1917 the Mahsuds were restive and attacked military convoys, garrisons and barracks. The Chief Commissioner in June 1917 asked for instant military expedition to maintain British writ and prestige. The task was given to Major-General Beynon and with the help Waziristan Field Force subdued the tribes. It is interesting to know that Habibullah sent a letter to the Viceroy, requesting him that the British should mildly punish the Mahsuds 'so as not to embarrass him and to prevent the outbreak of a general border conflagration that might draw both countries into war.'¹⁴⁵

The British Government in India was fortunate enough that the call for holy war and the skirmishes and fighting in the Tribal areas did not spiral out of control into a general conflagration. The first and foremost factor was the attitude of the Amir Habibullah who had great influence over the trans-border Pashtun tribes. During the course of war, the Viceroy, time and again informed the Amir about his responsibility, kept informing about the movements of his subject and urged him to control them. To the great relief of the British he not only remained neutral despite under severe pressure in Kabul, he managed with great success to check and control his own subject and the tribes on the other side of the border or otherwise he could create some very serious problems for the British. "His Majesty" writes Roos-Keppel "has displayed unprecedented boldness in his attitude towards the mullas and the Jihad party and has incurred much unpopularity, but his attitude and action have been of incalculable value to us."¹⁴⁶

The second important favourable factor for the Government was the loyal behavior of Afridis, one of the most powerful tribes as majority of them loyal throughout the course of the war. They played an important role to drive 'an effective wedge between the tribes of the northern and southern borders of the province.'¹⁴⁷ Apart from financial inducement, the role and influence of Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan, the then Assistant Political Agent of Khyber greatly helped in making the Afridis quite during the war.

¹⁴⁴ Hopkirk, *On Secret Service East of Constantinople*, p 186.

¹⁴⁵ Adamec, *Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*, p 99.

¹⁴⁶ Baha, L., 'The North-West frontier in the first World War'.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

In Roos-Keppel's words, he was "anchor to which Tirah is moored". The third factor in the Government's favour was the cooperation and loyalty of the Khans and Nawabs, and Arbabs in the settled districts who volunteered to help the government to put down the tribal disorders.¹⁴⁸

When First World War ended, the situation on the Frontier appeared to Roos-Keppel quieter and calm, in his opinion, "no history" for the year 1918-19.¹⁴⁹ On 10, January 1919, Roos-Keppel wrote to Maffey: "Everything on the Frontier is so extraordinarily peaceful that it is almost safe to prophesy a quiet summer."¹⁵⁰ His opinion soon proved mistaken; as in May 1919, the Third Anglo-Afghan War broke out, once more setting the Tribal belt aflame.

Conclusion

The British main concern during the First World War was to maintain peace and stability on its North-West borders which was of great importance due to its strategic location. The situation was very complicated and delicate because India was the soft belly of British Empire and was faced with both internal and external threats. The internal threat was from the freedom fighters who were striving for emancipation from British Raj and they were waiting for an opportunity to strike against the British. The external threat came from Central Powers especially, Germany and Turkey who used the disgruntled groups in India to fulfill their imperial designs. The key to success lies in the mountains of the Pashtun land where this great game was played. The Central Powers saw the role of religion for the success of their plan and strategy. Under the banner of a holy war, the Germans and Turks hoped to start violent insurrection against the British in India. To fulfill their plan they sent mission to Afghanistan to convince the ruler of Afghanistan to side with the Central Powers and declare *Jihad* against the British Raj in India. They also tried to instigate the frontier tribes to rise against the British but with little success. The role of the Amir was of paramount importance as he could create serious problems for the British if he would agree to the request of Central Powers.

The British had to fight on home front against a variety of groups entrenched in the Tribal areas. The British were lucky to have an experienced officer in the shape of George Roos-Keppel as the Chief-Commissioner, who very tactfully and with great prudence analysed the whole situation on the North-West Frontier Province in general and Tribal areas in particular encounter both local and foreign intrigues. Apart from some occasional fighting in the Tribal areas he failed all efforts to form a united front by those groups against the British which could have disastrous

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province, 1918-9 part I., p 1.

¹⁵⁰ Roos-Keppel to Maffey cited in Baha, *NW.F.P. Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919*, p. 100.

political and military consequences. The British failed Turco-German agenda despite their efforts via money, propaganda and diplomacy to provoke large scale uprising in Frontier and the whole of India.

But as Lord Curzon once warned that 'No man who has read a page of Indian history will ever prophesy about the Frontier', ¹⁵¹ because crisis on the Frontier always develop with alarming speed, usually when they are unexpected and almost invariably at the worst possible moment. Such was the spectrum immediately after the end of the First World War. Habibullah the man behind British successful policy during the war was assassinated in January 1919; in May 1919 Afghanistan invaded the North-West Frontier of India and the third Anglo-Afghan started and set ablaze the Frontier.

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¹⁵¹ Swinson, *North West Frontier People and Events 1839-1947*, p 344.

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GEOGRAPHY, INSURGENCY IN THE PASHTUN BELT ALONG DURAND LINE, PAK-AFGHAN BORDER

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Abstract

This paper will examine the importance of geography in Taliban insurgency against the US along with distinctive features of Pashtun culture. As history is unfolding in the Pashtun belt of the Pak-Afghan border region, it is pretty much reminiscent of former Soviet Union's (USSR) departure from Afghanistan February 15, 1989, where Afghanistan was left to Mujahedeen warlords. At present after the formal end of the US occupation of Afghanistan in 2014 has created almost the same problem with the slight difference that there is a weak and corrupt government in Kabul whose writ is limited to major cities and simultaneously destabilized Pakistan in general and Pashtun areas in particular. Our research question is looking for causes for the failure of both the US military strategy as well as transplanting of Western style political system in basically a tribal society. Relying on history, we believe that both the former Soviet Union and the United States under-estimated cultural resilience, geographic realities and fighting endurance of Afghan in general and Pashtun in particular.

Keywords: Taliban and the US occupation.

Introduction

One of the longest American wars is winding up in a politico-military dead-end in Afghanistan, and that is consistent with those of previous empires that have tried to pacify the region. Afghanistan's landlocked and mountainous geography, harsh climates, simplicity of life (i.e., less dependent on modern amenities), lack of roads and historically

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evolved warrior ethos (most of the time Pashtuns were at war with invader from its north) have proved to be the greatest defense and offense assets of Pashtuns against foreign intrusions. These aspects have proved their efficacy starting from Alexander the Great adventure in mid-300 B.C. to British colonial project in the 19th century, the former USSR in the last quarter of 20th century and the current US-led NATO war-on-terror in the present time. One sign of the US current *kulturkampf* is that 14 years ago most of the Afghan women were covering themselves in public space with completely covered veils (burqas) and today women still use burqa. The Taliban carry on to be a significant political force and, as a result, the US and the Afghan government were in direct negotiations with Afghan Taliban in Qatar that later collapsed without making any significant step forward. Pakistan recently organized China, the US and Taliban mediation that failed after news of Mulla Omar's death surfaced. Taliban's relevance is noticeable in Pentagon's November 4, 2015, statement that the United States would not aggressively pursue the Afghan Taliban in its counter-insurgency actions rather the US see them as a relevant agent in creating peace in Afghanistan ("Afghanistan," November 5, 2015).

Demographically Pashtuns are about forty million that inhabits a large area in both Afghanistan and Pakistan that has never been fully assimilated into both states (Akbar Ahmad cited in Ginsburg, 2011, p. 89). History and origin of Pashtun tribes are shrouded in mystery; there are only theories about their history. Molvi Mir Ahmad (2010) and others have a detailed discussion about the lineage of Pashtuns, but all of them are theories. Kakakhel's comprehensive book on Pashtun's history (*Pashtun Tarikh Kay Aayeenay Mein*) covers many aspects of Pashtun people and the role of geography in their culture (2007). *Tarikh-e-Pashtun* provides an excellent genealogical account of Pashtun tribes but has little to offer as far as the cultural evolution of Pashtun (Gandapur, 1979). Most of the Pashtuns live in the mountainous and geographically harsh milieu and without taking into account the physical environment, it is quite difficult to comprehensively understand the cultural complexities of the region. Pashtun belt is surrounded by imposing Pamirs, and awesome Himalayas, that is drawn out and crisscrosses the mighty Hindu Kush ranges. Its southern section touches the Indian Ocean, in the north Oxus River separates the region from the former Soviet Republics (Wilber, 1953).

Because of its strategic location, Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan has played a central role in the lengthy military history of Asia. Alexander the Great, and fifteen hundred years later Jenghiz Khan, with a massive number of soldiers had a difficult time in this region while invading India. It is important to mention that these superior military geniuses of their time sustained substantial losses from numerically inferior Pashtun tribal force. Afghanistan is the vital road link to Central Asia but because of its geography, it is a logistical nightmare for invaders (Strausz-Hupe, 1943).

The region is a unique combination of extremeweathers, i.e., hot deserts and frigid mountains that could be a formidable challenge to any large-scale logistical operations and smooth movement of people from one place to another (Strausz-Hupe, 1943).

The mountain area located towards the northwestern part of Pakistan known as western bordering mountains constitutes many mountain ranges from the great Hindu Kush in the north to Makran hills in the south. The boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan—the Durand Line—drawn in 1893 passes through these western mountains (cf. Durand, 1899; Holdich, 1901). This border between the two countries is highly porous, and there are numerous valleys in between which are inhabited on both sides. Some passes are connecting the two nations. Due to the similarity of culture and geographical proximity population movement in these mountains is quite common both across the border and within the region. Although with the passage of time this whole area became accessible, however still few locations are not yet accessible to motorized traffic. Besides physical and culture similarity, this entire mountainous region is characterized by barren land and limited water availability. The traditional livelihood strategies cannot fulfill the basic needs of the rapidly growing population. The possibilities for expanding economic activities and job opportunities is limited. Therefore, the inhabitants are usually engaged in two major activities in addition to their traditional economic organization. This includes out-migration to large urban centers within the country and abroad mainly to the oil-rich states of the Gulf, which has become one of the main survival strategies of the inhabitants. Secondly, many people in the region are involved in cross-border trade with the neighboring countries. However, there is fluctuation in business depending on the law and order situation in both neighboring countries as well as in tribal areas. In the past cross-border trade was an important economic activity; however presently out-migration seems more dominant strategy for survival.

Another significant opportunity was poppy cultivation in the region as this area is very suitable to grow this crop but since many years all such crops are banned by the state. Also, the war on terror, initiated by the USA, in the aftermath of the 9/11 episode has a considerable impact on these people. Their economic activities greatly suffered due to war in Afghanistan as well as military operation in these areas. In most cases, these areas were evacuated, and the inhabitants were shifted to the low land as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The whole infrastructure was destroyed including houses, roads, irrigation facilities and other amenities. This has disturbed not only the social fabric but also the economic organization of the region. Most of the rich people have shifted and settled in urban centers where they have started various commercial activities. This has also affected the real estate business in the main urban centers like Peshawar, Islamabad, and Lahore. In these areas, urban expansion became much rapid as most of these tribal

people settled there. The poor households suffered a lot as they lost all assets and still living in IDP camps.

If we imagine that historical process is governed by some causal determinations, then we believe geography will be one of the most important factors in unfolding of history. As in many other places on planet earth, geography determined not only the agro-economic feature of Afghanistan but also the fate of foreign intruders in this landlocked region. Strategically located between the arid and steppe lands of Central Asia in the northwest and the rich alluvial plains of South Asia, especially, the Punjab or the land of five rivers, in the southeast, Afghanistan served as an entry and/or exit point for empires of rising and falling regional powers such as the Sassanid Persians, Macedonian Greeks, Mauryan Indians, Muslim Arabs, and Turko-Mongols.

At the turn of almost every second century between 500 B.C. and 1500 A.D., this region dealt with foreign militaries who, rather than settling and making Afghanistan their permanent home, used its places and people as resources for further and further invasions or defenses. Unlike the great agricultural lands of southern Mesopotamia, northern Egyptian delta and the Indus-Gangetic plains, Afghanistan with its high mountainous central plateau and the hot and arid southern deserts of subsistent agriculture discouraged massive settlement of foreign forces. In the end, it was strong group solidarity of Pashtun tribes in the face of foreign enemies and hostile terrain of Afghanistan that thwarted the strategic designs of great powers, from Alexander to British and Russian empire builders.

The people of Afghanistan always remained apprehensive of the foreign elements temporarily living among them. Thus the nature of Afghan geography and people, on the one hand, and the grand designs of foreigners on the other bred only suspicions and wariness between the two groups who found themselves stuck in a volatile relationship built on occupation and disloyalty (Khan, 1997). Geography offers interactional context for a given population and that, in turn, determine environment for mobilization of people in the conflictual situation. To resist occupation or challenge an oppressive government is contingent upon popular support and access to material recourse that are facilitated by the geographic contours of the region (Weidmann, 2009).

Toft (2003) believes that geographic factor plays a crucial role for deployment of fighting forces in a conflictual situation (in Weidmann, 2009). It is essential to understand the evolution of culture and its relation to geographical factors. Geography creates possibilities that humans can exploit to their advantage. Geography, according to Professor Oldknow, (2000) does not make people good or bad, but it has a utilitarian value, and it

¹ Oldknow, Anthony, Professor of English Literature, Eastern New Mexico University, Portales. Professor Oldknow is also an expert on the subject of Geography. I interviewed him on May 13, 2000. I have cited him in other places too.

creates opportunities. Certain geographies are conducive to illegal economies and guerilla warfare and Pashtun belt offers these potentials.

Physical and Anthropogenic Characteristics of the study area

This area does not have bumper cash crops, and that could create economic uncertainty. By this, we mean, poor or no industrial base, poor agriculture, limited business opportunities, and poor and inadequate education facilities. This situation has created a typical scenario for freedom and according to Dani (1967) this tribals had a, highest passion for freedom. "Having little property to defend or lose, they were ever ready to stake their lives for freedom, which was their greatest stake. They were born guerilla soldiers who knew every break in the hills and twist in the valleys" (Dani, 1967 p. 125)

We assume that uncertainty was pre-existing in the social and economic structure of the area and was precipitated by the Afghan war and its subsequent effects. We further assume that marginal people are very flexible in their value-system. In this context flexible morality or value-relativity make economic pragmatism possible. We also assume that tribesmen know that it is an illegal activity in Pakistan, and at the same time they know that its illegality makes it a valuable act. Value-relativity is determined by the interaction of cultural traditions, economic, and geographical factors. Economically pragmatic people are usually high in Entrepreneurial Skills. It would be fair to say that every human activity has Geographic conditions.

When one looks at Afghanistan/KP, the physical geography, it is both Corridor and a Barrier. The combination of corridor and barrier makes movement possible but because its remoteness and rough terrain enemies cannot easily access it. The majestic Hindu Kush mountain ranges as a classic barrier. The physicalgeographic milieu of southern and eastern Afghanistan and the region bordering Pakistan are ideal for guerilla warfare (Collins, 2013).

We do not imply geographic determinism, but if there is motivation to resist then geography is a great facilitator of the insurgency. The social and cultural elements that have engendered robust and consistent resistance "to outside control and the physical geography that has enabled local forces to harass and target invaders" (O'Loughlin, Witmer, & Linke, 2010, p. 466).

Because of its isolation, the illegal economy of smuggling and narcotic flourished. One can transport merchandise from the Central Asia to Pakistan, and from China via Wakhan to Iran, all sorts of opportunities are available.

It is this ideal combination of barrier and corridor that attract smugglers and drug traffickers.²

Geography and Insurgency

Insurgency is a struggle for delegitimizing government or occupation through subversive armed activities with the goal to occupy power and resources of space by deploying irregular military forces along with political wing for gaining popular support (United States Marine Corps Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (GAI, 2012) nicely described insurgents. An insurgency is a form of fighting where a small group of fighter attack big armies using hit and run tactics. An armed group could be fighting for ethnic identity, religion, and collective interests.

Insurgents try to undermine writ of the government and shatter public perception by sabotaging infrastructure and other state institutions of law and order. Once ordinary people see the weakness of government, they actively, passively and out of fear support these armed groups.

Guerrilla warfare is amorphous because it lacks front lines, sequenced battles, or campaigns; a long-drawn-out stratagem, often enduring for many decades (GAI, 2012).

Unfavorable geography can doom an insurgency because of its exposure to government attacks and lack of supplies. Galula (2006) enumerates significance of geography in greater detail. He believes physical contour of a region, its size, climate, demographic profile, economic resources and proximity to international borders ultimately determine the viability of an insurgency.

South-East Afghanistan and North-West frontier belt of Pashtuns are conspicuous for what Scott called "anti-state nationalism" or tribal confederacy that is quasi-stateless (in Ginsburg, 2011). State institutions are definitely weak, but it is not anarchic. Pashtun Code of honor called Pashtunwali mediate everyday problem. It will be germane to our topic to discuss briefly cultural aspect of Pashtuns.

Pashtunwali is an unwritten code of social practices and dispute resolution mechanism that offers some direction in everyday disputes. One indicator of its resilience is that ordinary people still go to time-honored rules of Pashtunwali for settling their disputes. (Haring, 2010). *Jirga* is a socio-political institution that settles the dispute within the framework of Pashtunwali (Ginsburg, 2011). *Jirga* is an institutional mechanism for interpretation and enforcement of Code of Pashtunwali (Kakar, 2004, p. 2). One major strength of Pashtunwali is its vagueness and the code be calibrated realities on the ground and changing social environment. Sometimes their decisions are barbaric, but it is a strong deterrent to a would-be offender in

² Ibid.

this seemingly lawless region. Functionally speaking it has maintained a social order (Ginsburg, 2011). Pashtun people interacting with hostile geography decentralized social organization has evolved with the passage of time warrior ethos. Pickering described mountain people beautifully:

Savage yet of rigid morality. Revolutionary yet conservative. Covetous yet provident. Democratic yet opposed to civilisation. Passionately independent yet of arrested political development. Honest yet piratical. Lawless yet united. Healthy yet closely intermarried. The flurry of adjectives continues: Mountaineers are warlike, courageous, wretched, brigands, brave, lovers of liberty, half barbarian, isolated, poverty-stricken, reactionary, exponents of retarded civilisation, rude and simple, proud, vigorous, rustic, honourable, industrious, frugal, and even Short (Pickering 2011, p. 4)

Pashtuns are generally speaking ethnocentric and romanticize their culture and physical space. They have a strong group solidarity when it comes to foreign enemies. Geography also has symbolic value for rallying emotions of people. Khyber Pass and Tatar Hills in Khyber Agency are romanticized in Pashto folk and literary traditions as symbols of Pashtun's freedom loving spirit. Lincoln thinks that Highlanders are cliquish and insulate themselves to out groups. They are generally cordial but do not easily mix with others groups (2002). Their lifestyle is a unique set of contradiction and Abdul Ghani Khan a Pashtun poet and intellectual have exquisitely summarized character of a Pashtun in following quotes:

The Pathan (Pashtuns) has a tender heart but tries to hide it under a rough and gruff exterior. He is too good a fighter to leave his weakest part uncovered. "Don't be so sweet," he says, "that people may swallow you up, nor so bitter that people may spit you out," So he covers his sweetness with bitterness, self-preservation pure and simple, His violent nature, strong body and tender heart make a very unstable combination for living but an ideal one for poetry and colour. He keeps a rough face because he does not want you to see his soft eyes (Khan, n.d., p. 12).

Pashtuns love their pride even if financially they are indigents. According to Ghani Khan (Khan, n.d.), a Pashtun will rather rob somebody than extending a hand for charity. Warrior philosophy, rugged geography, the spatial distribution of population and along with State capacity or occupying forces inability to control remote and inaccessible area is limited played a key role in insurgencies. Insurgents sustainability is their capacity to endure and absorb attacks and geography can assist in that aspect (Raleigh, 2010). Schutte thinks that disproportionate use of force by government forces in remote areas could result in collateral damages that in turn is a great recruiting tool for insurgents (2014). Raleigh correctly

believes that hostile geography accompanied by thick forests provide excellent cover for insurgents and simultaneously state the ability to project force diminishes in such areas (2010).

It is relatively difficult to projecting power in a region where the terrain is rough, and knowledge of the area by insurgent provide sanctuary and a stable place from where they can collect revenues (Buhaug et al., 2009). Similarly, Herbst believes that distance plays a significant role in irregular warfare. Government forces are clearly physically challenged if they have to operate over a long and hostile area. Demographic distribution, e.g., sparsely populated areas pose a significant logistical challenge to government and occupation forces (2000). Toft thinks that in an asymmetrical warfare a poorly equipped group could compensate their military inferiority with geographic advantages (in Buhaug et al., 2009). Physical barriers for movement of military forces and hardware e.g. bad or no roads could have heavy financial cost over a long period. Poor knowledge of geography and cultural incompetency generally result in hurting local traditional sensitivities and that in turn enhance insurgent support. Geography facilitates retreat of insurgents when under pressure where they can replenish their resources for a sustained campaign. Rebels who are familiar with the layout of the region are in better position against superior military forces such as former USSR and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Buhaug et al. correctly hypothesized:

1. Engagements situated in the rough terrain can be sustained for a longer time.
2. Skirmishes in the proximity of an international boundary will have long endurance.
3. Therefore, other things being equal the military superiority of a sitting government declines as it moves to far flung areas away from their main military garrisons (Buhaug et al., 2009).

Using analogical reasoning Taber (1970) nicely captured American dilemma in Afghanistan. He thinks that in flea and dog encounter flea has an upper hand because of its small size is highly maneuverable. A flea can move in different directions very easily while dog because of its size cannot keep pace with a flea and in the end, the dog is exhausted by a small enemy. In military language, the dog becomes very weak and succumbs to fatigue because of overstretched energies against a less visible enemy. The same logic applies to guerrilla warfare where the goal is not winning a decisive battle but to exhaust enemy in series of small skirmishes that in the long run will lead to the defeat of a bigger force.

Spinney (2011) reiterated Taber's conclusion that in a long drawn war in an alien territory can exhaust a superior force against a small but mobile enemy. Because of the unpredictability of insurgent strategy a bigger force loses much needed initiative. This frustration could lead reliance on air

power against insurgents that most of the time result in the death of non-combatant civilians which further alienate the locals. It has been attributed to Taliban that “The Americans have a clock, but we have the time” meaning the US has schedule while for insurgents it is an open-ended enterprise (Spinney, 2011, para. 3-4).

Another significant dimension of the insurgency is demographic distribution. People who are highly concentrated in a particular locale will generally have strong group solidarity and will be deeply attached to their land. People who are emotionally attached to their space will fight any invader who threatens it. Settlement pattern and frequent interaction among its inhabitants better equip them to coordinate their activities in a combat situation. In the sameway, apopulation that is dispersed or scattered are less capable of coordinating their activities and hence less likely to launch a successful insurgency (Weidmann, 2009). Duffy’s (2002) explains the significance of geographical proximity and insurgency. Chechnya sustained a war against Russia for a longer time because they were concentrated in one region but Tataristan could not replicate Chechen’s model because of dispersal of their population. Duffy argues “that the reason is that the dispersed settlement pattern of the Tatars circumscribed their bid for independence, while the concentrated status of the Chechens afforded them both the capability and the legitimacy to pursue independence(p. 85).”

Dispersed groups are less capable of mobilizing public opinion in their favor and, therefore, have weak legitimacy and limited capability (Duffy, 2002). It is because of Pashtun belt geographic proximity and strong group solidarity that after spending tremendous resources both military and economical, most of the Afghans see the US as an enemy and not a savior (Yousafzai & Moreau, 2012). Strong group solidarity is also an essential factor in the insurgency. Withers believes that “sense of place is taken to embrace the affective attachment that people have to place” (2009, p. 640).

Sack (1997) believes homeland has an experientialcomponent, and that is why people are romantically attached and are nostalgic about it. It is this sentimental attachment to a piece of land that evokes strong nationalistic and patriotic feelings against an intruder into that space.

Conclusion

Based on empirical discussion and extensive literature review, in this paper, it is evident that Geography of an area plays a pivotal role in a guerilla war against any outside invasion. Physically the harsh climatic characteristics, topographical constraints and acquaintance with the land features are favorable factors for the insurgents and posing an imminent threat to the government as well as other forces engaged in military operation/invasion and other punitive actions at both local and regional levels. Additionally, population distribution specifically the ethnolinguistic

composition is also a determinant factor in an insurgency situation. It is evident from this research that when a group of people, having the same language, integrated ethnic characteristics, cultural values and sharing the same sentiment with respect to their independence, self-reliance and determined to liberate their homeland from any foreign invaders and occupant, cannot be subdued. Rather they can defeat more powerful forces equipped with the latest warfare technology. This has been vividly proved many times in case of Afghanistan for the last more than a century –whereby the British, the Soviets and the US were given a very tough time by both numerically and a technologically inferior group of resolute fighters.

The present research is focused on the US war on terror where the United States of America along with her more than 45 allies attacked Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 episode. Since this area has proved to be Geographically very hard and highly favorable for guerrilla warfare and the so-called insurgent group had practical experiences of guerrilla warfare and had its root in the local inhabitants. The latter is widely distributed in the whole country in addition to the rugged mountains located on the Eastern side of the Durand Line. The combating experience and tactics of the invaders have been successfully countered and the allied forces substantially failed due to harsh environmental conditions, intricate topographical setup hostile nature of the local inhabitants and ability of the insurgents to capitalize on these favorable factors. Consequently, after huge expenditure on military expedition, indiscriminate bombing of the Pashtun belt, loss of human life and property, the invaders were unable to overcome the region. Thus, the geographical attributes of a place both physical and anthropogenic played an overwhelmingly decisive role in the war on terror initiated by the United States and her allies.

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ARCTIC AS A CONFLICT ZONE? OPTIONS FOR RUSSIA

Moonis Ahmar*

Abstract

Four major issues which can transform Arctic as a conflict zone are: first, the Russian assertion about North Pole as its sphere of influence albeit the assurance given by Moscow that it has no aggressive or expansionist designs in the Arctic region. Second, since the end of the cold war, Russia has conducted combat exercises and revitalized its Soviet era military bases along its Arctic coast thus alarming other stakeholders of the Arctic region. Third, geologists hold the view that the Arctic region has 20 percent of oil and 15 percent of global gas reserves. The scramble for natural and mineral resources in the Arctic region may trigger conflict among big powers who want to exploit the melting of the Arctic ice for establishing their foothold on the roof of the world. Finally, within the Arctic Council, which was established in 1996, there exists friction as Canada and Denmark express their resentment over Moscow's perceived 'expansionist' drive in the Arctic in the backdrop of its annexation of Crimea and support rendered to nationalist Russian groups in Eastern Ukraine. Russia's perceived expansionist drive by annexing Crimea and its territorial ambitions in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics seem to have granted some ground to feel insecure vis-à-vis Moscow covert territorial ambitions in the Arctic region.

Key Words: Arctic Council, expansionist, conflict, cooperation, global warming, win-win-situation.

Introduction

Arctic region, commonly known as the North Pole is emerging as a conflict zone because of the melting of Arctic ice and the presence of huge oil and gas reserves. Furthermore, the unfreezing of the Arctic ice will

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provide a shortest navigation route from Europe to Asia and enable Russia which has the longest Arctic coast to play a dominant role as far as future of the Arctic region is concerned.

Since 2007 when a Russian-led polar expedition traveled through the frozen waters of the Arctic Ocean in a *Mir* submarine and planted a titanium Russian flag on the sea, Artur Chilingarov, one of the polar explorers proudly declared that “Arctic has always been Russian.”¹ One can view what Arthur said as mere rhetoric but in the last few years, Moscow’s cogent role in the Arctic Sea is alarming. With the intensification of global warming emanating from climate change, the melting of Arctic ice in a fast pace is predicted thus opening opportunities for an all weather navigation and the exploitation of natural resources particularly oil and gas.

Four major issues which can transform Arctic as a conflict zone are: first, the Russian assertion about North Pole as its sphere of influence albeit the assurance given by Moscow that it has no aggressive or expansionist designs in the Arctic region. Second, since the end of the cold war, Russia has conducted combat exercises and revitalized its Soviet era military bases along its Arctic coast thus alarming other stakeholders of the Arctic region. Third, geologists hold the view that the Arctic region has 20 percent of oil and 15 percent of global gas reserves. The scramble for natural and mineral resources in the Arctic region may trigger conflict among big powers who want to exploit the melting of the Arctic ice for establishing their foothold on the roof of the world. Finally, within the Arctic Council², which was established in 1996, there exists friction as Canada and Denmark express their resentment over Moscow’s perceived ‘expansionist’ drive in the Arctic in the backdrop of its annexation of Crimea and support rendered to nationalist Russian groups in Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s perceived expansionist drive by annexing Crimea and its territorial ambitions in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics seem to have granted some ground to feel insecure vis-à-vis Moscow covert territorial ambitions in the Arctic region.

Yet amidst signs of negative conflicts, Arctic region can also be transformed as a model of cooperation because the littoral states can use the vast and enormous reservoir of mineral and marine resources for mutual benefits. The Arctic Council can play a pivotal role in forging areas of cooperation among the members for making use of the melting sea for navigation purposes. By working together, Arctic Council members can prevent militarization of the region and take steps to protect environment and ecology of the North Pole.

Since Russian northern borders are the longest along the North Pole as compared to other Arctic countries, its strategic, security, economic and

¹ “The Arctic Frozen conflict,” *The Economist* (London), December 20, 2014, p.82.

² Arctic Council was established in 1996 and is composed of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Russian Sweden and the United States.

political interests in that region are quite obvious. Russian foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin consider Arctic region a major challenge and an opportunity to reassert Moscow's global role. The options for Russia to deal with the emerging conflicts in the Arctic region needs to be examined from two angles. First, to make sure that the Arctic is not dominated by the Western powers and second, Russia controls the sea lanes which will be open for navigation as a shortest route from Europe to Asia after the projected melting of Arctic ice by the year 2030. Already, there is increased navigation during summer along the Arctic coast because in the summer of 2014, 71 ships crossed the north-east passage of Arctic as compared to 46 ships in 2012³. One can also expect major stakeholders in the North Pole trying to interpret Law of the Seas Convention of 1982 in order to reassert their claims over their territorial waters and continental shelf. How their efforts will yield positive results are yet to be seen. With these facts in mind, one can expect large-scale activities in the Arctic region ranging from establishing naval, military bases, exploitation of mineral and natural resources, industrialization and urbanization in the vast coast which is still frozen most of the times of the year but its pace of melting is quite fast. Then, there are also non-Arctic countries like Japan, China, Germany and France having their strategic, economic and commercial interests growing because of the melting of the Arctic ice. To what extent, the littoral states of the Arctic Sea will view the ambitions of non-Arctic countries is yet to be determined.

This paper will examine the emerging conflicts in Arctic and options for Russia by raising and responding to following questions:

1. How the melting of the North Pole ice can *impact* on the geological, political, security and economic dynamics of the Arctic region?
2. To what extent the Arctic Council can *promote* cooperation and manage conflict in the Arctic region?
3. What are Russia's *interests* in the Arctic region and how other members of the Arctic Council perceive Moscow's aggressive rhetoric?
4. What are Russia's *options* to deal with the impending conflict the Arctic?
5. Can the Arctic region be a *model* of cooperation rather than conflict?

The Arctic Landscape and Global Warming

The North Pole commonly described as the Arctic region like Antarctica is an almost frozen piece of land but is fast melting because of global warming and environmental degradation. Located in the North Pole, "the Arctic Ocean proper is divided into two deep basins, the Canadian and the Eurasian, separated by the submerged Lomonsov Ridge, which runs from

³ "The Arctic Frozen conflict," *The Economist*, *Op.cit.*

the Laptiev Sea to Ellesmere Island crossing the North Pole. The Eurasian Basin reaches a depth of 4,200 meters and is further divided by the Gakkel Ridge into the Greenland, the Svalbard archipelago and Russia's Taimyr Peninsula. The Canadian Basin reaches depth of 3,500 meters and is also divided into sub-basins by the Alpha Ridge."⁴ Since centuries, Arctic is not navigable but geographical explorers in the last 500 years managed to reach the far north of the Arctic Ocean and found Eskimos living in that frozen region of the world.

Therefore, "for centuries, North Pole remained inaccessible but with the modernization, science and technology Arctic was colonized. Hence, "the Arctic has seen significant economic activity since the end of the nineteenth century, and played an important military-strategic role in the global wars of the twentieth century. In the second half of twentieth century, there was rapid growth in economic activity and population size. Over the same time period the Arctic climate was warming at a rate significantly faster than that of the rest of the globe. From the middle of twentieth century, summer sea ice extent fell by nearly 8% per decade, with comparable declines in ice volume and thickness. Yet economic and demographic developments have been driven more by political than environmental considerations and the High North remains sparsely populated rarely visited and barely governed."⁵ While human beings played with the nature by excessive industrialization, urbanization and modernization of means communication and transportation, lust for resources and power resulted into deforestation and the melting of glaciers. One wonders where the waters of the melting of Arctic and Antarctic regions will go. Certainly, the future of numerous islands on the Pacific and Indian Oceans are at stake and the rise in sea levels will not only eliminate such islands but will also threaten many coastal towns and cities. The outbreak of wars and the use of lethal weapons also caused irreparable damage done to environment. Furthermore, the burning of forests as a result of wars also seriously pose a damage to global environment and the future of the earth. When the Iraqi forces were defeated during the Gulf war over Kuwait in the spring of 1991, while retreating back to Iraq they burned several hundred oil fields causing a lethal damage to the environment. Likewise, hundreds of nuclear tests conducted since 1945 till 1990s also caused enormous damage to global environment. Burning of jungles during wars also led to environmental degradation along with deforestation as a result of fall in the quantum of rain and snow.

Global warming and hole in the ozone layer alarmed not only scientists but also those who termed earth as highly vulnerable to periodic earthquakes, cyclones and floods. Arctic, as the roof of the world, poses a fundamental challenge of 20th century. Therefore, "with global warming

⁴ Christian Le Miere and Jeffrey Mazo, *Arctic Opening Insecurity And Opportunity* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2013), p. 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

rapidly melting Arctic sea ice and glaciers making valuable stores of energy and minerals more accessible, voices of doom are warning of inevitable competition and potential conflict, a new “Great Game” among the five Arctic coastal nations.”⁶ It means, with the melting of Arctic ice, the region, which for centuries remained out of human competition is now exposed to serious conflicts thus jeopardizing the use of enormous mineral, mineral, natural and marine resources.

According to Kenneth Chang “The decline of ice will continue to affect life in the Arctic. It will open up shipping lanes and the possibility of oil drilling. The extent of Arctic Sea ice, which retreats in summers, didn’t hit a record low in 2014. But it was the six lowest since satellite measurements begin in 1979 and the scientists noted that the eight smallest extents have occurred in the last eight years.”⁷ Greenpeace and other environmental organizations are seriously concerned over the new phase of lust and greed of countries trying to exploit the resources of Arctic region at the expense of adhering to environmental standards. Furthermore, “the melting of the summer sea ice has also opened up trade routes between Arctic and Europe via the top of the world. 71 cargo ships plied the north-east passage last summer up from 45 in 2012.”⁸ To what extent, the predictable melting of North Pole will open opportunities for cooperation and areas of conflict will be determined on the basis of how the littoral states deal with such issues in the days to come and how the international and regional environmental organizations respond to such issues.

Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation in the Arctic Region

The melting of the North Pole is a process which will take years but the indications are that if there is lack of consensus among the members of the Arctic Council, in that case, they will not be able to cope with geographical, political, security and economic implications of the melting of the North Pole. While global warming emanating from decades of environmental pollution tends to play havoc with the lives of millions of people in different parts of the world, the melting of glaciers and rise in the sea levels can have catastrophic implications. As rightly said by the experts on the Arctic region that, “the Arctic is certainly changing and is doing so rapidly. There is not a prior reason to assume that this change will lead to conflict and confrontation, nor is there any reason to be complacent.”⁹ But, the geographical, environmental and ecological transformation of the Arctic

⁶ James F. Collins, Ross A. Virginia, Kenneth S. Yalowitz, “Hands across the melting ice,” *International New York Times*, May 14, 2013.

⁷ Kenneth Chang, “Arctic area heating up faster than rest of globe,” *International New York Times*, December, 19, 2014.

⁸ See “The Frozen conflict,” *The Economist*, *Op.cit.*

⁹ Christian Le Miere and Jeffrey Mazo, *Op.cit.*, p. 10.

region must not unleash new threats and insecurities because of two main reasons. First, the indigenous people living in the North Pole will be a victim of big power scramble and second, a life time opportunity to make the best use of the resources of the Arctic will be lost for a long period of time. Hence, before it is too late, there is still time for the members of the Arctic Council to take steps for cooperative, instead of conflicting policies so that the fate of a region which has so far escaped from armed conflicts is saved.

While the gradual melting of Arctic will open opportunities for shorter sea routes from Europe to Asia bypassing the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean, it will also expose the North Pole to the opening of a new 'great game.' Yet, one can expect the members of the Arctic Council and other potential players in the Arctic region to think in terms of cooperation rather than plunging the region into a perpetual state of conflict, chaos and disorder. Christian Le Miere and Jeffrey Mazo in a book, *Arctic Opening Insecurity and Opportunity* examine the changing dynamics of Arctic by arguing that,

*The changing Arctic should be viewed as a sphere of potential cooperation rather than one of competition. There are potential economic benefits from international exploitation of the Arctic, although the riches are not as great as often claimed. However, the region currently lacks the security architecture that would facilitate this cooperative dynamic. The military increases in the region that are currently occurring can largely be explained as Russia simply rejuvenating the decrepit Northern Fleet and Arctic littoral countries attempting to prevent the creation of a large ungoverned space.*¹⁰

The Arctic Council provides a hope for the peaceful use of the resources of North Pole. Certainly, the Arctic Council "can be a forum for cooperation and momentum toward a responsible approach to the region's issues. In fact, Arctic states of North America, Europe and Russia, working with indigenous peoples and number of non-Arctic states, already have taken steps to ensure just the opposite: that the Arctic remains a zone of cooperation, peace and stable sustainable development."¹¹ In order to examine issues encompassing the Arctic region, in February 2013, 40 leading Arctic scholars, government officials, including leaders and representatives of indigenous people met in Washington DC under the auspices of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dartmouth College, the University of Alaska Fairbanks and the University of Arctic to examine issues facing the region viz. Arctic energy, health, commercial shipping, security and governance and to make recommendations for action for the Arctic Council.¹² Institutional arrangements to cope with present and future challenges in the Arctic region

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p 11.

¹¹ James F. Collins, Ross A. Virginia, Kenneth S. Yalowitz, *Op.cit.*

¹² *Ibid.*

will be highly useful provided the major stakeholders are positive in their approach and take plausible steps for fostering cooperation instead of promoting conflicts. Think tanks, research centers and institutes working on the Arctic region must share their research so as to have a purposeful and meaningful impact on the policies of those powers who are also the major stakeholders in that region. The melting of the Arctic ice has no doubt opened new areas of research so as to explore new opportunities for cooperation and examine issues which can be a source of negative conflicts.

A major issue which is a source of friction in the Arctic region is territorial claims made by some of the members of the Arctic Council. For instance, on December 15, Denmark stated that “under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) some 900,000 square kilometers of the Arctic Ocean north of Greenland¹³ belongs to it. Claims under UNCLOS have to be made within ten years of ratification and the Convention became law in Denmark on December 16, 2004. But its claim conflict with those of Russian, which has filed its own case under the UNCLOS. Canada plans to assert sovereignty over part of the polar continental shelf.” Denmark’s claim will test whether Russia is willing to stick to the rules of the Arctic. It is based on a provision of the law of the sea which says countries may control an area of seabed if they can show it as an extension of their continental shelf.¹⁴ Nevertheless, “the Arctic coastal states are pursuing claims for territorial shelf extension beyond 200 miles for exclusive access to additional oil and gas reserves, but they have agreed their differences will be settled under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and through diplomatic channel.”¹⁵ As remarked by Jochen Bittner, “East vs. West in the Arctic Circle” that “the area around the pole is not yet divided up among its adjacent states. Its waters and potentially rich natural resources are claimed by Russia, as well as by three NATO members: America, Denmark (via Greenland) and Canada. Many of these claims overlap.”¹⁶ So long, territorial claims of some of the members of the Arctic Council are peaceful, one can expect plausible solutions but if non-peaceful methods are used to enforce their claims, the outcome may be disastrous for the entire Arctic region.

Therefore it is not wrong to argue that, “the risk of conflict over the ownership of contested territories is likely to grow. Five of the Arctic states have asserted exclusive drilling rights to boundary areas also claimed by one of the others and control over the polar region itself remains contentious.”¹⁷

¹³ Greenland is a self-governing part of Denmark.

¹⁴ “The Frozen conflict,” *Op.cit.*

¹⁵ James F. Collins, Ross A. Virginia, Kenneth S. Yalowitz, *Op.cit.*

¹⁶ Jochen Bittner, “East vs. West in the Arctic Circle,” *International New York Times*, April 29, 2016.

¹⁷ Michael T. Klare, “The rush for the Arctic’s riches,” *International New York Times*, December 9, 2013.

The U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel warned that “in an area with the potential for tapping what may be as much as quarter of the planet’s undiscovered oil and gas a flood of interest in energy exploitation has the potential to heighten tensions over other issues.”¹⁸ “With the demand for oil at an all-time high and existing fields incapable of satisfying global needs the major energy firms are bound to pursue every conceivable source of supply. It is essential then, that tough constraints be placed on Arctic drilling operations and that steps be taken to reduce tensions in the area.”¹⁹ Although, presently, oil prices have slumped and there is more supply than demand, but one can expect rise in the prices of oil and its demand if world economy grows at a faster pace. Therefore, “most of the Arctic states have also asserted their right to defend their offshore territories hence their ability to fight in these areas. Russia, for example, recently announced plans to establish what it calls a cutting edge military infrastructure in the Arctic.”²⁰ Again, it is better if the forum of Arctic Council is used by Canada, Denmark and Russia having territorial claims over the North Pole instead of approaching UNCLOS of legal complications which may impede a peaceful resolution of contentious issues.

Russia and the Scramble for the Arctic

Russia’s age old dream and ambition to get a wide access to warm waters may be accomplished if the Arctic sea melts in coming years. Furthermore, with the melting of the Arctic sea, Russia will also benefit from vast quantity of oil and gas reserves along with marine resources and its Arctic ports will earn enormous amount of money as a fee for navigation from foreign ships traveling to North and East Asia. With around 50% of the Arctic coast controlled by Russia, Moscow is certainly emerging as a major player in the perceived new ‘great game.’ Russia’s policy towards Arctic was vividly examined by Ekaterina Klimenko in the following words:

*Russian policy shifted noticeably in 2008. While Russia did not abandon its plans of military modernization in the Arctic, it did change the narrative of its policy to focus on building cooperation. Although the 2008 Foundations of the Arctic Policy document was created under the Security Council and underlines the importance of restoring Russia’s military power, it also provides a balanced view of the Arctic region by defining the area as a zone of cooperation.*²¹

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Ekaterina Klimenko, *Russia’s Arctic Security Policy Still Quiet in the High North?* (Stockholm: SIPRI Policy Paper 45, February 2016), p.5.

Furthermore, according to the same author, “during the latter part of the 2000s and early 2010s Russia was actively searching for new partners to develop energy projects in the Arctic. Gazprom negotiated with a number of foreign companies on the possibility of jointly developing the vast resources in the Arctic seas.”²² About the 2008 policy document of Russia concerning its Arctic policy, Elina Wilson in her article, “Russia’s Northern Policy: Balancing an Open and Closed North” argues that, “the 2008 policy document on Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and Beyond, marked the re-emergence of North as separate policy field. The policy itself is wide ranging and similar to many ways to the northern policy documents of the Arctic states. It emphasizes soft issues, such as environment and human security and highlights common interests such as coastal Arctic states. The document also underlines the importance of the Arctic resource base (onshore and offshore) and of Arctic shipping routes for Russia’s future economic development.”²³ Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, the Russian military and security establishment feels confident to transform its age-old vision of gaining supremacy on its northern waters into a reality. But, Russia’s re-renewed tension with the West on the issue of Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea caused a deep sense of concern and insecurity among the members of Arctic Council about Moscow’s perceived expansionist designs. Sanctions imposed on Russia by the West on its intervention in Ukraine and depleting oil prices however tend to put a question mark about the capacity of Russia to play an assertive role in the Arctic region.

In September 2015, Russia made a formal claim to a vast stretch of Arctic territory before the UN committee dealing with overseas sea boundaries. Russia’s bid was a re-submission of an earlier claim which was rejected by the UN in 2002 for insufficient evidence that the continental shelf abutting its landmass extends far into the Arctic Ocean and therefore allows it to claim an exclusive economic zone over the part of the ocean. In early 2015, Russia conducted large military exercises there (Arctic Sea), and many Soviet era bases have been reactivated under the newly formed Arctic Joint Strategic Command. It is rightly argued that, “as the largest Arctic state, Russia has the potential to use the region for diplomatic gain and influence alongside and because of the obvious economic benefits. Competition for influence clearly exists in the form of the U.S. and Canada but these countries either lack an extensive Arctic presence (the former) or the willingness to open up trade routes to develop economic leverage. The Nordic countries are dwarfed by Russian struggle to compete for

²² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²³ Elina Wilson Rowe, “Russia’s Northern Policy: Balancing an ‘Open’ and ‘Closed’ North,” Russian Analytical Digest No. 96, 12 May, 2011, p. 2. www.laender-analysen.de/russland/red/pdf/Russian_Analytical_Digest_96.pdf accessed on May 21, 2016.

international or even regional influence. Russia by contrast can use the Arctic both to increase its influence on global shipping lanes and to encourage closer ties with the Nordic countries, thereby greatly fracturing the European/NATO alliance in the North.”²⁴ According to Michael T. Klare,

*The Russians have explored drilling options in several offshore areas of the Arctic. In the Pechora Sea, above north western Siberia, the Russian energy giant Gazporon has installed its Pfiraziownaya platform, the one protesting Greenpeace activists attempted to board. Further east, in the Kara Sea the state owned Rosneft is collaborating with Exxon Mobil to develop several promising deposits; Rosneft has also teamed up with Statoil of Norway and Eni of Italy to investigate prospects in the Barents Sea. But Russia is hardly alone in seeking to exploit the Arctic. Norway also derives considerable income from gas and oil exports and is under pressure to develop reserves in the Barents Sea to compensate for the decline of its existing fields in the North and Norwegian Seas.*²⁵

The same author further substantiate his argument about Russia’s quest to exploit oil and gas reserves in the Arctic region by stating that, “Russia which recently seized a Greenpeace ship and is prosecuting 30 of the group’s activists for attempting to scale an oil platform, the temptation to exploit the Arctic Ocean is specially powerful. Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on exports of oil and gas, and the government relies on these sales for much of its income. Until recently, the Russians could draw on reservoirs in Western Siberia but now, they are counting on Arctic supplies to maintain current production levels. Dmitri Medysdev, the then Russian President claimed in 2008 that, “our first and main task is to turn the Arctic in the Russia’s resource base of 21st century.”²⁶ Russia has access to four other seas and oceans through the extensive coastlines: the Baltic, Caspian and Black Seas and the Bering Sea/Sea of Okhotsk/Pacific Ocean only the latter of which allows Russia access to the open ocean without having to pass through other countries territorial waters.”²⁷ Furthermore, Russian activity in the Arctic has also increased. In August 2007, Moscow renewed long-range aviation patrols to the Atlantic and the Pacific, and over the Arctic oceans.”²⁸ What matters in the prevailing scramble for the Arctic is the image of Russia as an expansionist state particularly after the annexation of

²⁴ Christian Le Miere and Jeffrey Mazo, Op.cit.

²⁵ Michael T. Klare, *Op.cit.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (New York: Random House 2010), quoted in Arctic Opening, *Op.cit.*, p.132.

²⁸ Arctic Opening, *Ibid.*, p. 86.

Crimea and support to Russian nationalist forces in Ukraine. Will Russia present a benign instead of an aggressive/expansionist power as far as the Arctic region is concerned?

Certainly, the perception about Russian ambition to control the Arctic may be different from the reality because of two main reasons: first, the regime of Vladimir Putin, although considered tough is certainly not pursuing the Soviet approach of outright aggression in a region which is also shared by other powerful countries. Second, Moscow has never outright claimed the Arctic region, but has made it clear that it will not surrender its territorial limits. The reopening of Soviet era naval bases along Russia's Arctic coast doesn't mean that Russia want to embark on a militaristic policy. In its essence, perception about Russian designs in the Arctic are different from the reality.

Arctic as a Model of Cooperation?

It will be a gross exaggeration to subscribe to the notion that the North Pole will be another conflict zone in the years to come. While, in view of disagreement between Russia on the one hand and other members of the Arctic Council namely Canada and Denmark on the other hand, the Arctic region may experience a low intensity conflict, one needs to be optimistic about making sure that the resources of Arctic are used as an opportunity for cooperation.

It is rightly suggested by Michael T. Klare that, "one way to impose formal restraints would be to devise and adopt an Arctic Treaty modeled on the Antarctic Treaty of 1958. It could also impose environmental protection and provide for the safe passage of civilian vessels through Arctic waters."²⁹ Members of Arctic Council must share the responsibility of making the best use of the resources of the region so as to protect the natural environment and facilitating proper navigation of ships once the sea melts is the Arctic Sea is used for the shortest trade and transport route from Europe to Asia.

Four options may be considered by the stakeholders of the Arctic region for ensuring peace and stability. First, Russia must dispel notions prevailing among some members of the Arctic Council that it has aggressive and expansionist designs in the region. While one can understand Moscow's position on the Arctic in view of historical policy of certain Western powers and Japan to contain Russia and prevent its access to open Sea, it is time that the Russian leadership under President Vladimir Putin must move forward instead of getting bogged down in the past. Second, the Western members of the Arctic Council, who also happen to be the members of NATO, must not create the impression that Russia is being isolated, encircled by hostile states or excluded. A policy made on mutual accommodation and prudence will go

²⁹ Michael T. Klare, *Op.cit.*

a long way in ensuring peace and stability in the Arctic region and ensures win-win situation for all the stakeholders in the Arctic region.

Third, in view of enormous natural resources in the Arctic and the possible friction in the region, the Arctic Council needs to adopt Trust and Confidence-Building Measures so that the major stakeholders of the Arctic region are able to work together instead of pursuing an approach marred with mistrust, ill-will and suspicion against each other. When Arctic Sea will be open for navigation, instead of monopolizing sea routes, the littoral states must follow International Law and ensure free navigation to the users of the waters of Arctic Sea. Practical application of Trust and Confidence Building Measures modeled on Helsinki Final accords of August 31, 1975 will go a long way in ensuring Arctic as a Zone of Peace and tranquility. Finally, the members of Arctic Council must work together to protect indigenous people and environment of the region. Since global warming has unleashed the process of the melting of the Arctic Sea, it is essential that heavy industrialization and urbanization should be prevented and ecology free policies be adopted in order to protect marine resources and air. Lust for money and grabbing resources at the expense of local people must be avoided.

Knowing that Russia is a major player in the Arctic region, no headway for purposeful and meaningful cooperation in North Pole can take place without the involvement of Moscow. But Russia must also understand that the win-win situation in the Arctic region is only possible when the members of Arctic Council reject any move which aims at domination, expansion and militarization of the region. Arctic council needs to be made more effective before more contentious issues emerge involving Russia on the one side and other members of the Council on the other.

DYNAMICS OF INTRA-INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION BETWEEN PAK-CHINA TRADE

Shafaqat Mehmood and Ather Azim Khan***

Abstract

We have analyzed the factor adjustment problems that may be experienced by China and Pakistan, due to trade openness resulting from Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Variations in indicators (i.e. total trade, net trade, intra-industry trade, Grubel-Lloyd index and trade ratio) have been used to achieve the research objectives. Our estimates captured a small number of industries, which encountered adjustment problems. Therefore, our findings facilitate the regulatory authorities to implement controls on tariffs and rates to enhance imports and exports from their sensitive sectors, in order to improve economic growth and best use of FTA.

Introduction

Free Trade Agreement (FTA) leads to boost production, trade,¹ and investment among member countries, and ultimately to enhance economic growth.² Trade agreement based trade flows among countries can be divided into two major parts namely: Inter-Industry Trade (IT) and Intra-Industry Trade (IIT). IT is exchange of entirely different commodities between economies.³ Countries usually involve in IT according to their competitive advantages.

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¹ Siddique, M. A., Regionalism, Trade and Economic Development in the Asia Pacific Region. Bodmin, Cornwaa: MPG Books Ltd. 2007.

² Keynes, J. M., General theory of employment, interest and money. Atlantic Publishers & Dist. 2006.

³ Don Clark, "Adjustment problems in developing countries and the U.S.-central america-dominican republic free trade agreement," *The International Trade Journal*. Issue No. 23, 2009, pp. 31-53.

Pakistan and China have strong positive trade relations. These two countries are contiguous and the common border plays workhouse role to promote trade relations. On November 24, 2006, these two countries signed China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (CPFTA) and this agreement was then enforced in July 2007. The purpose of CPFTA was to strengthen their relationship, eliminate trade barriers, and promote trade and investment contracts, to generate economic growth.⁴ CPFTA was expected to boost the volume of current bilateral trade between Pakistan and China to three times within a time span of five years. CPFTA covered expropriation, investment and its treatment, promotion and protection, dispute settlement, and compensation for damages or losses.

CPFTA was signed by the ministers for commerce of Pakistan and China (i.e. Humayun Akhtar Khan and Bo Xilai) in the presence of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Chinese President Hu Jintao. An agreement of Early Harvest Program (EHP) was also negotiated by these two countries to provide the basis for establishing CPFTA. It was decided under CPFTA that, Pakistan and China will start eliminating or decreasing tariffs on all commodities in two separate phases.

The first phase of decreasing tariffs was started in 2006, followed by the second phase two years later. The lists of items at that time contained products such as fruits, blended and synthetic fabrics, home textiles, marble tiles, sports goods, chemical raw materials, surgical goods, medicines and industrial machinery among others. These lists were to be expanded later on to cover additional goods. It was also decided that during Phase I, both countries will trim down the tariffs to 85 percent within five years after enforcement of CPFTA. Furthermore, it was decided that tariffs will be eliminated on 36 percent of products within three years of enforcement of CPFTA. During the first phase, China decreased tariffs on vegetables, livestock, textiles, aquatic products, and mineral products, while Pakistan decreased tariffs on chemicals, beef and mutton, and machinery products.

Phase II of CPFTA was started after completion of the first five years of the agreement and it was decided that both countries will further decrease tariffs on commodities based on review of realization of agreement. The purpose was to remove tariffs on products up to 90 percent, both in terms of trade volume and tariff lines during a reasonable time period subject to friendly accommodation and consultation.

Economic integration creates a heavy amount of economic adjustment for each country. Economic adjustment costs are very high among countries. But within industries, economic integration is very valuable and resolves the problem of specialization within industries. Economic integration is even more valuable when it facilitates economies to realize

⁴ < <http://www.commerce.gov.pk> > [25 April 2014]

superior specialization within a similar industry. IIT represents a two-way trade in commodities having same industry classification. At this juncture, productive factors change with negligible internal trouble between sections of same industry. Therefore, producers are able to understand efficient scale processes based on this pattern of specialization. Consumers benefit from low prices and superior varieties of commodities. FTA accelerates trade growth both in IT and IIT. It is usually conceived that FTA between developing and industrial countries will produce more IT as compared to IIT.⁵

Objectives of the Study

This study is aimed at the following objectives:

1. To empirically explore the factor adjustment problems that may be experienced by China and Pakistan due to trade openness resulting from CPFTA.
2. To find the specialized sectors that came across the factor adjustment problems based on the dynamics of intra-industry specialized indicators.

Data and Empirical Methodology

Our analysis covers the period from 2004 to 2014 and uses two digit sectors level data on exports and imports of China and Pakistan. Data were gathered from UNCOMTRADE database according to two digit level of Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision two (see Table A.1).⁶

⁵ Clark, D., Adjustment problems in developing countries and the U.S.-central america-dominican republic free trade agreement, *The International Trade Journal*. Issue No. 23, 2009, pp. 31-53

⁶ <<http://www.comtrade.un.org/>> [Accessed 25 April 2014]

Table A.1: Commodity Codes and Description at 2-digit Level Based on SITC

SITC	Industry	SITC	Industry
00	Live Animals	56	Fertilizers
01	Meat and Meat Preparations	57	Plastics in Primary Form
02	Dairy Products and Birds' Eggs	58	Plastics in Nonprimary Form
03	Fish (Except Marine Mammal)	59	Chemical Materials
04	Cereals and Cereal Preparations	61	Leather, Leather Mfr
05	Vegetables and Fruit	62	Rubber Manufactures
06	Sugars, Sugar Preparations	63	Cork and Wood Manufactures
07	Coffee, Tea, Cocoa	64	Paper, Paperboard
08	Feeding Stuff for Animals	65	Textile Yarn, Fabrics
09	Miscellaneous Edibles	66	Nonmetallic Mineral Manufactures
11	Beverages	67	Iron and Steel
12	Tobacco and Tobacco Products	68	Nonferrous Metals
21	Hides, Skins and Furskins	69	Manufactures of Metals
22	Oil Seeds and Oleaginous Fruits	71	Power Generating Machinery
23	Crude Rubber	72	Machinery Specialized
24	Cork and Wood	73	Metalworking Machinery
25	Pulp and Waste Paper	74	General Industrial Machinery
26	Textile Fibers	75	Office Machines and ADP Equipment
27	Crude Fertilizers	76	Telecommunications Equipment
28	Metalliferous Ores	77	Electrical Machinery, Appliances
29	Crude Animal and Vegetable Mat	78	Motor Vehicles
32	Coal, Coke and Briquettes	79	Transport Equipment
33	Petroleum, Petroleum Products	81	Prefab Buildings
34	Gas, Natural and Manufactured	82	Furniture and Bedding
41	Animal Oils and Fats	83	Travel Goods, Handbags
42	Fixed Veg. Fats and Oils	84	Articles of Apparel and Clothing
43	Animal/Vegetable Fats/Oils	85	Footwear
51	Organic Chemicals	87	Professional Scientific Instruments
52	Inorganic Chemicals	88	Photo Appt, Equipment, Optical Goods
53	Dyeing, Tanning and Coloring Mat	89	Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles
54	Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Prod	93	Special transactions

Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index has been used to explore the intra-industry trade (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975). GL index is the ratio of intra-industry trade and total trade, which analyzes the intra-industry share in total trade.⁷ The general form of this index is as under:


⁷ Akm, A., Robert J. R. E., and Chris R. M., Static and dynamic measurement of intra-industry trade and adjustment: a geometric reappraisal, *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Issue No. 134, 1998, pp. 404-422.

$$GL_i = 1 - \frac{|Exp_i - Imp_i|}{(Exp_i + Imp_i)}$$

Where Exp_i indicates exports of industry i and Imp_i indicates imports of industry i . $|Exp_i - Imp_i|$ and $(Exp_i + Imp_i)$ indicate Net Trade (NT) and Total Trade (TT) respectively ($0 \leq GL_i \leq 1$ and $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, n$). An index having zero value shows complete inter-industry trade, which promulgates that either the value of imports or exports is zero. Index having higher values shows a rise of share of intra-industry in the total trade, while an index having value of 1 shows the equality between imports and exports or complete IIT.

Following the empirical work of Azhar, Elliott, and Milner (1998), Industry Trade Box (ITB) is employed to assess the factor adjustment problems through examination of the dynamics of intra-industry specialization indicators over the period under consideration. Figure 1 contains the industry trade box.⁸

Figure A.1: Industry Trade Box



Source: Azhar et al. (1998)

⁸ See Azhar et al. (1998) for in depth discussion on Industry Trade Box (ITB).

Results and Discussions

Table A.2 contains results of GL index of trade between Pakistan and China. There is an increase in simple average of GL index over the period 2004-2014. GL indices indicate that in case of 37 industries, IIT has increased relative to the total trade, and decreased in case of 16 industries, thus the changes in general values of average GL index are not large. However, there is no change in GL index for remaining 8 industries.⁹

⁹ See Appendix Table A.2 for the Grubel-Lloyd (GL) indexes resulting from trade between Pakistan and China

Table A.2: Grubel-Lloyd (GL) Indexes for Trade between Pakistan and China

SITC	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.083	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
01	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.080	0.284	0.202	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.161
02	0.000	0.000	0.172	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
03	0.0001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.005	0.002
04	0.170	0.296	0.749	0.397	0.126	0.578	0.268	0.965	0.486	0.121	0.243
05	0.043	0.012	0.021	0.020	0.101	0.020	0.026	0.014	0.040	0.072	0.105
06	0.001	0.386	0.897	0.032	0.011	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.277	0.000	0.022
07	0.457	0.002	0.017	0.032	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000
08	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.519	0.003	0.525	0.974	0.472
09	0.246	0.824	0.271	0.172	0.005	0.093	0.143	0.000	0.115	0.196	0.000
11	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.732	0.000	0.000	0.005
12	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.668	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
21	0.000	0.052	0.000	0.338	0.895	0.487	0.000	0.366	0.758	0.856	0.018
22	0.523	0.000	0.243	0.907	0.921	0.402	0.721	0.435	0.574	0.719	0.745
24	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
25	0.000	0.000	0.142	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.035	0.256	0.000
26	0.097	0.109	0.663	0.783	0.459	0.595	0.764	0.231	0.131	0.502	0.617
27	0.496	0.406	0.204	0.914	0.653	0.460	0.704	0.828	0.741	0.515	0.306
28	0.167	0.242	0.447	0.237	0.121	0.054	0.052	0.019	0.011	0.051	0.026
29	0.339	0.380	0.000	0.411	0.588	0.903	0.694	0.843	0.785	0.743	0.709

SITC	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
32	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
33	0.488	0.010	0.628	0.000	0.000	0.775	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.535
34	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
41	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.651
42	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.002
43	0.000	0.904	0.000	0.000	0.057	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.136
51	0.764	0.959	0.753	0.681	0.059	0.658	0.271	0.105	0.025	0.124	0.041
52	0.000	0.000	0.025	0.000	0.003	0.005	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.003
53	0.0001	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.006	0.011	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.014
54	0.028	0.038	0.013	0.009	0.009	0.014	0.013	0.006	0.009	0.005	0.006
55	0.125	0.012	0.014	0.009	0.039	0.000	0.015	0.014	0.011	0.005	0.008
56	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
57	0.610	0.284	0.349	0.679	0.547	0.063	0.147	0.416	0.381	0.573	0.795
58	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.011	0.045	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.018	0.005	0.001
59	0.012	0.002	0.012	0.026	0.020	0.011	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.015
61	0.169	0.308	0.489	0.077	0.109	0.051	0.014	0.033	0.036	0.017	0.024
62	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
63	0.000	0.029	0.011	0.008	0.000	0.004	0.004	0.008	0.018	0.007	0.005
64	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.005	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.007
65	0.163	0.146	0.289	0.411	0.486	0.728	0.780	0.885	0.853	0.634	0.799
66	0.029	0.048	0.014	0.012	0.034	0.027	0.050	0.020	0.024	0.062	0.051
67	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.115	0.021	0.066
68	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.030	0.053	0.145	0.314	0.593	0.452

SITC	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
69	0.054	0.068	0.088	0.082	0.084	0.131	0.083	0.092	0.046	0.043	0.033
71	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.048	0.072	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.007	0.005
72	0.022	0.001	0.000	0.010	0.002	0.011	0.010	0.072	0.016	0.064	0.085
73	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.072	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.022
74	0.000	0.011	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.005	0.052	0.005
75	0.0004	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.001	0.004	0.0005
76	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.009	0.006
77	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.027	0.000	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.003
78	0.048	0.218	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.004	0.013	0.011	0.026	0.0001
79	0.160	0.031	0.019	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.068	0.000	0.536
81	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.011
82	0.201	0.000	0.149	0.050	0.246	0.017	0.010	0.008	0.006	0.083	0.073
83	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.025	0.005	0.006	0.012
85	0.001	0.025	0.002	0.017	0.014	0.019	0.001	0.006	0.009	0.001	0.000
87	0.240	0.033	0.035	0.057	0.048	0.116	0.059	0.070	0.063	0.137	0.247
88	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.629	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
89	0.089	0.138	0.083	0.097	0.133	0.079	0.000	0.081	0.098	0.074	0.049
93	0.377	0.933	0.030	0.021	0.157	0.086	0.100	0.003	0.263	0.001	0.007

Variations in indicators (i.e. TT, NT, IIT, GL indexes and r) over the period 2004-2014 have been utilized to identify/measure the potential adjustment problems connected with greater trade. Industries are clustered based on regions identified in Figure 1, Figure 1 has also been used to analyze the factor adjustment inference of changes in the trade points.

Table A.3: Indexes of Intra-industry Specialization for Pakistan Trade with China

SITC	2004		2014					
	r_x	r_m	r_x	r_m	ΔTT	ΔNT	ΔIIT	ΔGL
$\Delta TT > 0$								
Region I								
61	10.9		83.2		28.685	30.610	-1.925	-0.145
Region II								
27		3.1	5.5		31.298	22.060	9.238	-0.189
28	11.1		75.7		152.26	148.98	3.278	-0.140
Region III								
03	18444		1170		52.235	52.122	0.114	0.002
08		-	3.3		34.619	18.269	16.349	0.472
21		-	107.4		0.970	0.952	0.018	0.018
29	4.9		1.8		11.298	3.016	8.282	0.370
33	3.1		2.7		20.793	9.349	11.444	0.047
65	11.3		1.5		1257.1	141.03	1116.1	0.636
Region VI								
00		-		-	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.000
01	-			11.5	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.161
02		-		-	0.194	0.194	0.000	0.000
04	10.7			7.2	12.270	9.266	3.004	0.072
05		45.1		18.1	92.659	81.633	11.025	0.062
11		-		428.1	0.152	0.151	0.001	0.005

2004					2014			
SITC	r _x	r _m	r _x	r _m	ΔTT	ΔNT	ΔIIT	ΔGL
12				-	0.006	0.006	0.000	0.000
22		2.8		1.7	8.653	2.154	6.499	0.222
24		-		-	0.614	0.614	0.000	0.000
25		-		-	0.473	0.473	0.000	0.000
26	19.6			2.3	235.74	84.280	151.46	0.521
34				-	0.976	0.976	0.000	0.000
41				2.1	0.219	0.077	0.142	0.651
42		-		1062.8	0.505	0.504	0.001	0.002
43		-		13.660	0.548	0.470	0.079	0.136
52		-		622.2	70.911	70.603	0.307	0.003
		403						
53		90		147.0	72.044	70.798	1.247	0.013
56		-		-	119.06	119.06	0.000	0.000
57		2.3		1.5	88.023	16.571	71.452	0.185
58		-		1986.5	39.561	39.520	0.041	0.001
59		160.5		132.2	88.316	86.881	1.436	0.003
62		-		51619.1	94.347	94.345	0.002	0.000
63		-		425.8	10.101	10.053	0.048	0.005
64		-		267.5	50.120	49.730	0.390	0.007
66		68.7		38.2	90.851	85.946	4.905	0.022
67		-		29.3	273.83	254.18	19.655	0.066
68		-		3.4	59.416	30.901	28.515	0.452
71		-		376.1	347.84	345.85	1.993	0.005

SITC	2004		2014					
	r _x	r _m	r _x	r _m	ΔTT	ΔNT	ΔIIT	ΔGL
72		91.4		22.4	199.95	180.44	19.514	0.064
73		-		88.0	10.029	9.748	0.280	0.022
74		-		436.4	344.49	342.85	1.647	0.005
		479						
75		2.7		4112.6	36.766	36.746	0.019	0.000
76		-		313.7	608.59	604.61	3.981	0.006
79		11.5		2.7	112.67	51.578	61.089	0.377
81		-		186.4	17.443	17.239	0.204	0.011
83		-		160.8	9.886	9.757	0.129	0.012
		284						
85		2.3		6190.3	49.311	49.296	0.015	0.000
		7.33						
87		6		7.1	57.221	42.960	14.261	0.008
Region VII				-				
54		70.8		314.2	77.367	77.353	0.015	-0.021
55		15.1		253.0	23.480	23.407	0.073	-0.117
69		36.3		59.3	141.47	137.14	4.333	-0.020
77		415.7		722.6	369.73	368.76	0.972	-0.002
82		8.9		26.3	8.104	7.523	0.581	-0.128
89		21.5		39.6	136.46	130.29	6.158	-0.040
Region VIII								
07		3.3		43488.7	36.417	38.795	-2.378	-0.457
09		7.2		-	4.942	4.965	-0.023	-0.246

2004					2014			
SITC	r_x	r_m	r_x	r_m	ΔTT	ΔNT	ΔIIT	ΔGL
51		1.6		47.8	210.82	240.52	-29.698	-0.723
78		40.9		18008.4	92.236	92.522	-0.285	-0.048
88		356.5		-	7.761	7.781	-0.020	-0.006
		4.30						
93		0		297.5	0.267	0.539	-0.272	-0.371
$\Delta TT < 0$								
06		198		88.1	-55.841	-55.947	0.106	0.021
		0.9						
32		-		-	-3.009	-3.009	0.000	0.000

In Table 3, r_x and r_m denote to understand the movement in trend of trade balance (i.e. from net exporter to net importer and from net exporter to net importer). First difference operator is denoted by Δ . ΔTT , ΔNT , ΔIIT , and ΔGL denote first difference of total trade, net trade, intra-industry trade, and Grubel-Lloyd index respectively.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Net exporter plane} &= r_x = \text{Export (X)}/\text{Imports (M)} \\ \text{Net importer plane} &= r_m = \text{Imports (M)}/\text{Exports (X)}\end{aligned}$$

The first four regions (i.e. Region I, Region II, Region III and Region IV) are free from the adjustment problems and remains in net exporter plane. The remaining four regions (i.e. Region V, Region VI, Region VII and Region VIII) are net importer plane rather than in net exporter plane (see Figure A.1).

Clark (2009) documented that a huge rise in the value of TT can lead to value of IIT increasing more than NT. So, the decrease in GL index could be small relative to an increase in r_m . These fluctuations give some scope for factor reallocation. At this juncture, factor adjustment problems are exercised only if growth of NT goes above relative IIT growth. The presence of potential adjustment pressures depend on the shifting of an economy or industry from point A to another point within the limit of Region VIII. Huge increases in value of r_m are linked with decreases of both GL index and IIT, but raises in NT. At this point, imports increase and exports go down. A pronounced comparative disadvantage exists in Industries or economies that shift into Region VIII.¹⁰

Our findings (see Table A.3) show that Region I has one industry (SITC 61), which was in net exporter plane during the period under consideration; this industry practiced a huge raise in r_x based on the fast export growth. Both IIT and GL index are cut down with the boost in r_x .

Two industries (i.e. SITC 27 & SITC 28) fall into Region II. Out of these two industries, one industry (SITC 27) switched from net importer plane to net exporter plane and other industry as a net exporter plane over the 2004-2014 period experienced a large increase in the r_x . IIT, TT and NT increased, and the GL index was cut down. NT grew more as compared to the IIT. These industries are not anticipated to face adjustment pressures because they are engaged in net exporter plane, in line with Clark (2009).

Six industries (i.e. SITC 03, SITC 08, SITC 21, SITC 29, SITC 33 and SITC 65) appeared in Region V. Imports grew quicker than the exports but all of these industries fall under net exporter plane. In all these six industries, IIT, NT, TT and GL index rose. NT grew faster as compared to IIT in one

¹⁰ Clark, D., Adjustment problems in developing countries and the U.S.-central america-dominican republic free trade agreement, *The International Trade Journal*. Issue No. 23, 2009, pp. 31-53

industry. These industries are also not anticipated to face adjustment pressures because they are also engaged in net exporter plane.

Thirty-five industries fall in Region VI. Out of these industries, two industries (i.e. SITC 04 and SITC 26) switched from net exporter plane to net importer plane because imports grew quickly as compared to exports. Other industries remained net exporter plane over the period 2004-2014. r_m decreased in case of eleven industries because of increasing exports as compared to imports. In case of sixteen industries, their base period showed that these industries did not export but their imports increase as compared to their exports over the period under consideration. TT, GL index, NT and IIT rose in case of all the industries but NT grew faster than IIT in case of thirty industries. These findings are similar to Jambor (2003) who found that a shift from point 'A' to a point in region VI can give adjustment problems because the nation has transferred from net exporter to net importer. Export expansion will give some scope for factor reallocation. These movements do not put forward that Pakistan-China FTA is the reason of adjustment pressure for Pakistan.

Region VII has six industries (i.e. SITC 54, SITC 55, SITC 69, SITC 77, SITC 82 and SITC 89) in net importer plane. Moving from point 'A' to a point in Region VII, a link can be developed with potential adjustment problems. When an increase in NT goes over IIT expansion by a narrow margin, then a raise in exports might be sufficient to give some capacity for factor reallocation. A raise in r_m shows imports growing quicker than exports. NT, IIT and TT grew in case of all these industries but the GL index fell. Similar to Clark (2013), all of these industries may be applicants for the adjustment pressures because in case of these industries, NT growth is more than IIT growth.

Region VIII has also six industries (i.e. SITC 07, SITC 09, SITC 51, SITC 78, SITC 88 and SITC 93). These industries remained in net importer plane over the period under consideration. Out of these six industries, two industries did not show any export in 2014. All industries practiced a huge raise in r_m because of increasing imports as compared to exports. NT also changes with a large increase in case of all industries but IIT and GL index show decrease. Industries may be pronounced for the adjustment problems, which fall in Region VIII. The past movements in intra-industry specialization indicators show that these industries may be applicants to practice the factor adjustment pressures.

However, in general our results are consistent with previous empirical studies (Clark, 2009; Jambor, 2013 & Clark, 2013). Two industries (i.e. SITC 06 and SITC 32) show decline in TT during the period of 2004-2014. These industries also remained in net importer plane over the period under consideration. Value of r_m decreased in case of SITC 06 because exports rose relative to imports; IIT also rose and NT fell. So, in this case, it does not contain the adjustment pressures. SITC code 32 industry did not export

during the period under consideration. NT and TT decrease due to falling import levels. So, this industry will not practice adjustment pressures.

Conclusions

A significant scope has been found by present study for intra-industry specialization between China and Pakistan. A small number of industries of both economies encountered the adjustment problems over the period of analysis. Only twelve industries are applicants for adjustment pressures out of sixty-one industries (i.e. SITC 07, SITC 09, SITC 51, SITC 54, SITC 55, SITC 69, SITC 77, SITC 78, SITC 82, SITC 93, SITC 88 and SITC 89). These industries share 15% of the total import of Pakistan, 24 % of total imports of China. In line with Bernatonytė and Normantienė (2015) findings show that IIT seems to be an appropriate tool, which provides extra benefits from the international trade as compared to comparative advantage because IIT allows the concerned countries to get advantage from the larger markets. Based on the detection of out of sight factors adjustment problems, import safeguard can be employed. It is further suggested that the time period of the phases of tariffs and bound rates may be stretched to get free from factor adjustment problems in the import sensitive sectors. Therefore, our findings facilitate the regulatory authorities to implement the controls on tariffs and rates to reduce the factor adjustment problems, and enhance the economic growth through trade of sensitive sectors of both nations.

The paper has used only Pakistan China Intra Industry data to derive the results. For future research, it may need to look at the complete intra-industry data for Pakistan with all its trading partner, and more specifically with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) permanent members. As, Pakistan and India have become permanent members of the SCO recently, therefore, it may be useful to examine intra-industry trade among Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It may be the case, that there is a shift in Pakistan's export from China to some other country because (a) either the other country is offering a better price compared to China or (b) it is less costly to send it to the other country. If then the industry is facing factor adjustment problems, then it should try to assess what sort of issues might arise and how they can be addressed? Future researchers may also need to analyze (a) the trade flow among SCO member countries, and (b) potential for free trade area, which will lead towards possible solution/suggestions if the industries among SCO member countries are facing factor adjustment problems.

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